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1Corporate Cancellation of Indebtedness Income
and the Debt-Equity Distinction
Katherine Pratt
Writers often turn to Lewis Carroll for neat examples of 
how reasoning, correct in every step, can still lead to nonsensical 
conclusions when starting from a false premise.  Our tax laws and 
regulations have their share and more of such logically consistent 
absurdities.  But perhaps none [is] more unfortunate at the 
moment than those flowing from [Internal Revenue Code] Section 
61(a)(12), which defines taxable gross income to include gains 
from the discharge or cancellation of indebtedness . . . .  The 
general rule embodied in that section -- combined with some of 
the specific “exceptions” introduced by tax laws over the years ...
makes it uneconomic for many of today’s distressed corporations 
to seek voluntary, mutually satisfactory agreements with creditors 
to restructure existing debt contracts.1
I. INTRODUCTION. 
This Article considers whether a corporation should have cancellation of 
indebtedness income when it discharges its debt in exchange for new debt or 
stock. 
The corporate tax2 distinguishes between debt and equity.  The most 
important distinction between corporate debt and equity is the distinction between 
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 Merton H. Miller, Notes of Some Current Tax Obstacles to Voluntary Corporate 
Restructuring, 4 J. OF APPLIED CORP. FIN. 20, 20 (1991). 
2
 Our income tax system treats corporations as separate taxpaying entities. I.R.C. § 11 
(2000).
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interest and dividends.  Corporations can deduct interest paid or accrued on its 
debt, but cannot deduct dividends paid on its stock.3
The tax law also distinguishes between corporate repurchases of stock and 
debt.  A corporation does not have income if it retires stock for an amount that is 
less than the amount the corporation received on the issuance of the stock.4  If, 
however, a corporation retires debt for less than the amount owed, the corporation 
has cancellation of indebtedness income (COD income) in an amount equal to the 
amount owed on the debt less the amount paid to discharge the debt.5 Courts have 
applied this rule consistently to the discharge of debt for cash, but have varied 
their approach to COD income where a corporation discharges its outstanding 
debt for its new debt or stock.
Early case law established that the exchange of new corporate debt for old 
corporate debt and the exchange of new corporate stock for old corporate debt did 
not create COD income.6 The theory articulated in these debt-for-debt and stock-
for-debt cases is generally a substitution of liabilities theory.7  Courts in some cases 
also adopted a substitution of liabilities approach for purposes of determining
whether a corporation could deduct unstated interest, also known as original issue 
discount (OID),8 when it issued new debt in exchange for outstanding stock or debt.9
3
 I.R.C. § 163(a)(2000).
4 See I.R.C.  § 311(a) (2000).  Section 1032(a) provides that a corporation does not 
recognize gain or loss on the issuance of stock in exchange from property.  Treasury 
Regulations provide that § 1032 does not apply to a corporation's acquisition of its own 
shares unless the corporation acquires the shares in exchange for its own stock (although 
the regulation cross-references the § 311 regulations).  See Treas. Reg. § 1.1032-1(b). 
Section 311(a) provides that a corporation does not recognize gain on the distribution of 
property with respect to its stock.  See I.R.C §  311(a) (2000).  Property includes cash. 
I.R.C. § 317 (2000).
5 See I.R.C. § 61(a)(12) (2000).
6 See, e.g., Commissioner v. Coastwise Transportation Corp., 71 F.2d 104 (1st Cir.), cert. 
denied, 293 U.S. 595 (1934) (debt-for-debt exchange did not produce COD income to the 
extent that the face amount of the new debt equaled the face amount of the old debt); 
Capento Securities Corp. v. Commissioner, 47 B.T.A. 691, aff'd, 140 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 
1942) (stock-for-debt exchange did not produce COD income even though the face 
amount of the debt discharged was $500,000 and the stock issued in exchange for it was 
worth only $50,000).
7
 71 F.2d at 105-06; 47 B.T.A. at 695.
8
 Interest on corporate debt may be stated interest or unstated interest.  Stated interest is 
the interest that the corporate issuer must pay the bondholder periodically.  Unstated 
interest is (1) the stated redemption price at maturity of the debt (taking into account the 
stated interest), less (2) the issue price of the debt.  For example, if a three-year bond is 
issued for $1,000, has a stated redemption price at maturity of $1,340, and no stated 
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Over time, tax commentators, the Treasury, and Congress rejected the 
substitution of liabilities theory in favor of a hypothetical cash issuance model , both 
for purposes of computing COD income and OID.10 Under current law, COD 
income in a debt-for-debt exchange or a stock-for-debt exchange equals the 
amount owed on the outstanding debt less the fair market value of the newly 
issued debt or stock.11  It is as if the new stock or debt is issued for cash in an 
amount equal to the value of the new stock or debt and the hypothetical cash 
proceeds are used to discharge the outstanding debt. The OID rules also follow 
the hypothetical cash issuance model.  If new debt is issued in exchange for 
outstanding stock or debt, the issue price of the debt is the fair market value of the 
debt or stock where either is publicly traded,12 and the OID on the new debt 
equals the stated redemption price of the new debt less the issue price of the 
debt.13
This Article considers whether the current tax treatment of corporate debt 
discharge in debt-for-debt and stock-for-debt exchanges is warranted under two 
alternative normative approaches.  The first approach is a comprehensive tax base
or horizontal equity approach.14  Under this approach, we apply a general theory
of COD income to determine the appropriate tax treatment of corporate debt 
discharge in debt-for-debt and stock-for-debt exchanges.  The alternative 
normative approach is to determine the appropriate tax treatment of such 
transactions by applying principles of economic efficiency.15
To date, tax commentators have consistently adopted the first normative 
approach.16  They have stressed the desirability of applying the same debt 
discharge approach to all taxpayers, regardless of the type of transaction in which 
interest, the bond bears unstated interest of $340.  The Internal Revenue Code refers to 
this unstated interest as Original Issue Discount (OID).  I.R.C. § 1273(a)(2) (2000).
9 See, e.g., Commissioner v. National Alfalfa Dehydrating & Milling Co., 417 U.S. 134 
(1974) (corporate issuer could not deduct, as unstated interest, the  $17 difference between 
the $50 face amount of new debt the corporation issued and the $33 worth of outstanding
preferred stock for which the new debt was exchanged).
10 See infra Part III.  The argument in this Article relates to debt-for-debt or stock-for-
debt exchanges in which at least one of the securities exchanged is publicly traded.  
11
 I.R.C. §§ 108(e)(8) and (10), and 1273(b)(3) (issue price of debt issued in exchange for 
debt or stock equals fair market value where there is public trading of the stock or debt).
12
 I.R.C. § 1273(b)(3).
13
 I.R.C. § 1273(a)(1).  For an example, see supra note 8.
14 See infra Part IV.B.1.
15 See infra Part IV.B.1 and 2.
16 See infra Part II.
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the debt is discharged, and regardless of the taxpayer’s financial circumstances.  
Said another way, proponents of this approach have tried to fashion a consistent, 
comprehensive COD income rule for all debt discharge.17
Gradually, over a long period of time, we have rejected the substitution of 
liabilities approach to COD income and OID and adopted a hypothetical cash 
issuance model in its place.18 This Article highlights the historical connection 
between the COD income rules and OID rules and considers the COD income 
implications of this connection, keeping in mind the error correction function of 
the COD income rules.19
The earlier substitution of liabilities approach to COD, or a variation 
known as subscription price theory, can be reconciled with the theory underlying 
existing COD income doctrine, although it may require a different sort of error 
correction device than we currently employ.  Given the fact that we have a 
corporate tax, and it is not likely to be repealed, synchronizing COD income rules
and OID deduction rules may make sense only if we synchronize in the other 
direction, for example by eliminating the corporate interest deduction, or by 
adopting a cost of capital allowance system in place of the corporate interest 
deduction.20
If we equated the interest and dividend treatment of corporate issuers, 
corporations arguably should not have income from debt discharge, just as they 
currently have no income from dealings in the corporation’s own stock.21  Even if 
we retain the corporate interest deduction in its current form, we could fashion a 
different error correction device that requires interest deduction recapture in 
stock-for-debt exchanges.  In debt-for-debt exchanges, we could adopt a rule that 
precludes COD income where the face amount of the new debt at least equals the 
face amount of the old debt.
It may be preferable, from a normative perspective, to apply principles of
economic efficiency to determine the tax rules for calculating COD income in 
17 See, e.g., Boris I. Bittker and Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Income from the Discharge of 
Indebtedness: The Progeny of United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 66 CAL. L. REV. 1159 
(1978) (articulating the “loan proceeds” or “symmetry” theory of COD income).
18 See infra Part III.
19 Id.
20
 If Congress replaced the corporate interest deduction with a cost of capital allowance 
(COCA) system, corporations could deduct a fixed statutory percentage of the 
corporation’s total capital (debt and equity combined), but could not deduct interest.  A 
COCA system equates the treatment of debt and equity for purposes of taking a corporate 
tax deduction for the cost of capital.
21 See infra notes 230-240 and accompanying text.
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debt-for-debt and stock-for-debt transactions.22 Professor Weisbach has argued 
that we should determine the tax consequences of various types of transactions by 
attempting to minimize deadweight losses.23 For example, he argues that we should 
use this method to classify hybrid securities as debt or equity.24 We can apply this 
method to determine the consequences of debt-for-debt and stock-for-debt 
exchanges.
The issue is complicated because of the second-best setting in which the 
issue arises.25 The debt-equity distinction in the corporate tax creates a 
discontinuity that causes economic distortions.26 The hypothetical cash issuance 
model is designed to produce consistency in the treatment of all debt discharge, 
but this model may increase certain economic distortions caused by the debt-
equity distinction.  For example, using the hypothetical cash issuance model to 
determine COD income in debt-for-debt and stock-for-debt exchanges may
increase the costs of financial distress.27
This Article asserts that the synchronizing of the COD income rules and 
OID deduction rules in the 1980s and 1990s, and adoption of the hypothetical 
cash issuance model, may have taken us down the wrong COD income path, 
especially for troubled corporate debtors.  Instead of justifying our current 
approach based on notions of a comprehensive corporate tax base and horizontal 
22 See infra Part IV.B. 1. and 2.
23
 David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency in the Tax Law, 84 
CORNELL L. REV. 1627, 1664-72  and note 43 (1999) [hereinafter Weisbach, Line 
Drawing]; David A. Weisbach, An Efficiency Analysis of Line Drawing in the Tax Law, 
29 J. LEGAL STUD. 71 (2000) [hereinafter Weisbach, Efficiency Analysis]. 
24
 Weisbach, Efficiency Analysis, supra note 23, at 80.  Weisbach refines the analysis of 
Monthly Income Preferred Shares (MIPS) in an earlier article by Gergen and Schmitz.  
Mark P. Gergen & Paula Schmitz, The Influence of Tax Law on Securities Innovation in 
the United States: 1981-1997, 52 TAX L. REV. 119, 132 n.56 (1997).
25
 The theory of the second best posits that, in a world with multiple distortions, 
eliminating an economic distortion does not necessarily increase efficiency because of 
the effects of the other remaining distortions.  The classic example is the polluting 
monopolist.  Eliminating the distortion caused by the monopoly will increase production, 
but will also increase pollution, so it is not clear that eliminating the monopoly will 
increase efficiency.  R.G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of Second 
Best, 24 REV. ECON. STUD. 11 (1956-57).
26 See Jeff Strnad, Taxing New Financial Products:  A Conceptual Framework, 46 STAN. 
L. REV. 569 (1994).  
27 See infra Part IV.B.2.
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equity, we should perhaps consider whether the repeal of the debt-for-debt and 
stock-for-debt exceptions to COD income reduced efficiency losses or not.  
Congress adopted the hypothetical cash issuance model for COD income without 
sufficiently considering the economic effects of the new tax rules on workouts 
and bankruptcy restructurings.  
Part II discusses the development of several competing general theories of 
debt discharge. Commentators apply these theories to both individual and corporate 
taxpayers.  Part III tracks the historical development of the specific body of tax rules 
applicable to debt-for-debt and stock-for-debt exchanges and illustrates the 
continuing relationship between the COD income rules and OID rules applicable in 
debt-for-debt and stock-for-debt exchanges. Part IV considers and critiques the 
conventional normative justifications for the current treatment of debt-for-debt and 
stock-for-debt exchanges and suggests a different approach for these types of 
exchanges.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMPETING THEORIES OF CANCELLATION OF 
INDEBTEDNESS INCOME.28
This Part tracks the development of competing general theoretical 
approaches to cancellation of indebtedness income. As early as the 1920's the 
Internal Revenue Service (the Service) took the position that the discharge of debt at 
a discount created taxable income if the debtor was solvent,29 but did not create 
income if the debtor was insolvent30 or if the discharge occurred as part of a 
bankruptcy proceeding.31  The Service had difficulty convincing courts that its 
position was correct, however, because, at that time, income was defined as "the 
gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined."32  Courts concluded 
28
 For a detailed treatment of the development and erosion of the COD income doctrine, see 
James S. Eustice, Cancellation of Indebtedness and the Federal Income Tax: A Problem of 
Creeping Confusion, 14 TAX L. REV. 225 (1959) [hereinafter Eustice, Creeping Confusion].  
See also, Bittker & Thompson, supra note 17.  For an exhaustive list of articles addressing 
the issue of COD income, see note 2 of Theodore P. Seto, The Function of the Discharge 
of Indebtedness Doctrine: Complete Accounting in the Federal Income Tax System, 51 
TAX L. REV. 199 (1996).
29
 Reg. 45, Articles 51 and 544 (1921). 
30
 S.M. 1495, III-1 C.B. 108 (1924).
31
 I.T. 1564, II-1 C.B. 59 (1923).
32
 Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920).  Later, in Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass 
Co., income was redefined as "accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the 
taxpayers have complete dominion."  348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955).
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that cancellation of indebtedness did not produce income within that definition.33
However, the Service persisted in its position that debt cancellation produced 
income.
A. The Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire transactional accounting approach 
to COD income.
The Supreme Court first addressed the issue of COD income in 1926, in 
Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire.34  Kerbaugh-Empire had borrowed money from a 
German bank in 1911.  The loan proceeds, which were paid (and were to be repaid) 
in marks, were invested in a subsidiary of Kerbaugh-Empire.  The funds invested in 
the subsidiary were lost in the years 1913 to 1918 and the losses were deducted in 
those years.  The loan was later repaid in 1921 with devalued marks.  The Service 
argued that the difference between the dollar equivalent of what was borrowed and 
the dollar equivalent of what was repaid was COD income in 1921.  The losses 
taken as deductions in the years 1913-1918 exceeded the income from those years 
by an amount that exceeded the alleged COD income in 1921.  The Supreme Court 
held that the taxpayer did not realize COD income on the transaction because the 
taxpayer's losses exceeded its later income.  In other words, "[t]he result of the 
whole transaction was a loss."35
Citing the definition of income in Eisner v. Macomber,36 the Supreme Court 
concluded that the transaction in Kerbaugh-Empire:
did not result in gain from capital and labor, or from either of 
them, or in profit gained through the sale or conversion of 
capital....
The contention that the item in question is cash gain 
disregards the fact that the borrowed money was lost, and 
that the excess of such loss over income was more than the 
amount borrowed. . . . The loss was less than it would have 
been if marks had not declined in value; but the mere 
diminution of loss is not gain, profit, or income.37
33 See, e.g., Meyer Jewelry Co., 3 B.T.A. 1319 (1926).
34
 271 U.S. 170 (1926).
35
 271 U.S. at 175.  
36 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
37
 271 U.S. at 175.
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It seems, therefore, that the decision turned on the narrow definition of 
income at the time of the case, which has since been expanded to include all realized 
accessions to wealth.38
Five years later, the Supreme Court rejected a transactional accounting 
approach in Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co.39  In the years 1913 to 1916, the 
taxpayer had included in income payments made under a dredging contract with the 
United States.  The taxpayer also deducted the expenses of performing the contract.  
The expenses for those years exceeded the income by $176,000.  (Although the 
taxpayer's return showed losses for each of those years, the Internal Revenue Code at 
that time did not provide for the carryforward of net operating losses, so the excess 
losses were of no benefit to the taxpayer.)  In 1916, the taxpayer sued the United 
States for breach of the dredging contract.  In 1920, the taxpayer recovered 
$176,000, plus interest, from the suit.  The taxpayer did not include the recovery in 
income, but the Service took the position that the recovery was income to the 
taxpayer in 1920.40  The taxpayer argued that it did not realize income in 1920 
because it lost money on the whole transaction.  The Supreme Court rejected that 
argument and held that the taxpayer had realized income in 1920, despite the fact 
that the taxpayer lost money on the entire transaction.41  In other words, the case 
upheld the use of an annual accounting period.
B. Kirby Lumber and the freeing of assets approach.
Soon after the Supreme Court decided Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., it 
held, in United States v. Kirby Lumber Co.,42 that a taxpayer realized COD income 
when it repurchased its bonds at a discount.  The taxpayer in Kirby Lumber issued 
$12 million of bonds in 1923 at "par."43  Later in 1923, the taxpayer repurchased 
38
 Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955).
39
 282 U.S. 359 (1931).
40
 Our tax system requires the use of an annual accounting period.  I.R.C. § 441.
41
 282 U.S. at 364, 365.  The Court stated:
A taxpayer may be in receipt of net income in one year and not in 
another.  The net result of the two years, if combined in a single 
taxable period, might still be a loss; but it has never been supposed 
that that fact would relieve him from a tax on the first, or that it 
affords any reason for postponing the assessment of the tax until 
the end of a lifetime, or for some other indefinite period, to 
ascertain more precisely whether the final outcome of the period, 
or of a given transaction, will be a gain or a loss.
Id.
42
 284 U.S. 1 (1931).
43
 The bonds were issued in exchange for preferred stock, on which there were dividend 
arrearages, although that fact was not apparent from the opinion.  Boris I. Bittker, Income 
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some of the bonds at $138,000 less than the face of the bonds.  The issue in the case 
was whether the taxpayer realized income as a result of the repurchase of the bonds 
at a price less than their face amount.  The Supreme Court, in a cryptic two-
paragraph opinion by Justice Holmes, held that the taxpayer had realized income as 
a result of the repurchase of the bonds.  The Court distinguished Kerbaugh-Empire, 
saying:  "Here, there was no shrinkage of assets and the taxpayer made a clear gain.  
As a result of its dealings, it made available $137,521.30 assets previously offset by 
the obligation of bonds now extinct."44  This "freeing of assets" language became the 
benchmark for measuring COD income.
The early cases developing the COD income doctrine were Depression era 
cases involving financially troubled debtors.  Debtors can discharge their debts for 
less than the principal amount owed in two different situations.  First, a creditor will 
discharge debt for less than the full amount owed if the debtor is financially 
troubled, because the risk of nonpayment of the principal has increased.  Second, if 
interest rates have increased since the loan was made, a creditor may accept 
repayment of less than the full amount of principal due, because the creditor can 
reinvest the funds and earn a higher rate of interest on the principal.45
Courts in the Depression Era were reluctant to hold that financially troubled 
debtors incurred a tax liability when they discharged their debt for less than the 
amount owed.46  By focusing on the freeing of assets language in Kirby Lumber, 
From the Cancellation of Indebtedness:  A Historical Footnote to the Kirby Lumber Co.
Case, 4 J. CORP. TAX'N 124 (1977).
44
 284 U.S. at 2, 3.  
45 See Bittker & Thompson, supra note 17, at n.5 (adding that a creditor might also discharge 
debt for less than the amount owed if the debt was unenforceable, for example because the 
statute of limitations had run).
46
 Eustice, Creeping Confusion, supra note 28, at 236, 246 (noting that courts approached 
COD cases by responding emotionally, not logically, to the debtors' embarrassing financial 
plight); Patricia Bryan, Cancellation of Indebtedness by Issuing Stock in Exchange: 
Challenging the Congressional Solution to Debt-Equity Swaps, 63 TEX. L. REV. 89, 98 
(1984); Paul Asofsky, Discharge of Indebtedness Income in Bankruptcy After the 
Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980, 27 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 583, 583 (1983).  Asofsky notes Professor 
Surrey's argument that the financial problems of the debtor do not preclude inclusion of 
other types of income by the debtor, such as compensation, so perhaps the debtor's financial 
difficulties should not preclude the inclusion of COD (citing Stanley Surrey, The Revenue 
Act of 1939 and the Income Tax Treatment of Cancellation of Indebtedness, 49 YALE L. J. 
1153, 1164 (1940)). 
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courts created numerous exceptions to the COD income doctrine,47 including the 
"insolvency exception."48
Generally, the financial distress of a taxpayer does not preclude inclusion of 
the taxpayer's income.  For example, if a financially troubled taxpayer receives 
compensation income, the compensation must be included in income regardless of 
the taxpayer's financial condition.49  However, for purposes of computing COD
income, courts held, soon after Kirby Lumber was decided, that if a debtor was 
insolvent after the discharge of its debt at a discount, the discharge did not create 
COD income.50  The rationale was that no assets had been freed if the debtor's 
liabilities still exceeded the value of the debtor's assets after the discharge.51  If the 
debtor was insolvent before the discharge, but the discharge rendered the debtor 
solvent, the discharge created COD income to the extent the discharge made the 
debtor solvent.52  Under the freeing of assets approach, the focus is on the 
circumstances in the year of the debt discharge; circumstances in the year of the 
borrowing are irrelevant.
C. Application of the Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire transactional 
accounting approach in post-Kirby Lumber COD income cases.
Although some of the case law exceptions to Kirby Lumber, such as the 
insolvency exception, were consistent with the freeing of assets approach, other case 
law exceptions were not consistent with that approach. In a number of early COD
income cases, courts considered “the transaction as a whole,” citing Bowers v. 
Kerbaugh-Empire, meaning that they attempted to ascertain exactly how the 
borrowed funds were used and determine whether the whole transaction resulted in a 
gain or loss. 53  Courts also followed this approach in a number of later cases.54
47
 These exceptions included the case law stock-for-debt exception and debt-for-debt 
exception, which are discussed infra, in Part III.A.
48 See, e.g., Dallas Transfer and Terminal Warehouse Co. v. Commissioner, 70 F.2d 95 (5th 
Cir. 1934).  Congress later amended the Bankruptcy Code and the Internal Revenue Code to 
provide that debtors could exclude COD income from corporate reorganizations, but were 
required to reduce the basis of assets by the amount of debt discharged.  For a discussion of 
these legislative developments, see Eustice, Creeping Confusion, supra note 28, at 254-62. 
49
 I.R.C. § 61(a)(1).
50 See, e.g., Dallas Transfer and Terminal Warehouse Co. v. Commissioner, 70 F.2d 95 (5th 
Cir. 1934).
51 Id. at 96.
52 See, e.g., Lakeland Grocery Co. v. Commissioner, 36 B.T.A. 289, 292 (1937) (the 
insolvent taxpayer had income to the extent the debt discharge rendered the taxpayer 
solvent).
53
 Bradford v. Commissioner, 233 F.2d 938 (citing Bowers v. Kerbaugh Empire, 271 U.S. 
170 (1926)).
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For example, courts created an exception to Kirby Lumber in cases in which 
the discharged debt had originally been issued in exchange for noncash 
consideration or no consideration.55  The rationale for this exception was that, 
viewing the transaction (both incurring the loan and discharging it) as a whole, the 
transaction did not increase the debtor's net worth.56  In this line of cases, courts 
considered circumstances in the year of the borrowing.  These cases did not fit with 
the freeing of assets approach, because they took into account circumstances in the 
year of the borrowing, while the freeing of assets approach focused only on 
circumstances in the year in which the debt was discharged.
In Commissioner v. Rail Joint,57 the Second Circuit held that a taxpayer did 
not realize COD income when it repurchased bonds (which it had issued and 
distributed as a dividend on common stock) for less than the face amount of the debt, 
because the debtor did not receive any assets when it incurred the debt.  The Second 
Circuit distinguished Kirby Lumber, saying:
In the Kirby case a corporation issued its bonds at par and 
later in the same year repurchased some of them at less than 
par.  It was held that the sum thus saved was taxable income.  
The taxpayer's assets were increased by the cash received for 
the bonds, and, when the bonds were paid off for less than the 
sum received, it is clear that the taxpayer obtained a net gain 
in assets from the transaction.  The cost of the money 
54
 Seto, supra note 28, at n. 48.
55
 For example, in Bradford v. Commissioner, 233 F.2d 935 (6th Cir. 1956), Mr. Bradford 
owed a bank $305,000.  Mr. Bradford persuaded the bank to cancel his debt in exchange for 
his wife's note for $205,000.  That debt was later discharged for $155,000.  The Service 
argued that Mrs. Bradford had $50,000 of COD income from the transaction.  However, the 
court concluded that no COD income arose on the discharge of the debt.  Although the court 
noted that our tax system uses an annual accounting period rule, citing Burnet v. Sanford and 
Brooks, 282 U.S. 359 (1931), the court added that "in appropriate circumstances" a court 
could take into account the net effect of an entire transaction. 233 F.2d at 938.  Since Mrs. 
Bradford received no consideration when she incurred the debt, the loan transaction, as a 
whole, did not increase her net worth despite the fact that she discharged the debt for less 
than the amount owed.  Therefore, the court held that she did not have COD income on the 
discharge of the debt.  Had the court applied the freeing of assets approach, focusing only on 
Mrs. Bradford's increase in wealth in the year of the discharge, the discharge would have 
resulted in $50,000 of income to Mrs. Bradford. 
56 Id. at 938.
57
 61 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1932).
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acquired by issuing the bond was decreased when the bond 
was retired at less than the issuing price. . . .
[Kirby Lumber] is not applicable to the facts of the case at 
bar.  In paying dividends to shareholders, the corporation 
does not buy property from them.  Here the respondent never 
received any increment to its assets, either at the time the 
bonds were delivered or at the time they were retired.58
Courts, unwilling to apply the freeing of assets approach in circumstances in 
which taxing the debtor seemed unfair, applied transactional accounting concepts in 
order to conclude that the debt discharge did not produce COD income. As 
authority for invoking transactional accounting rules in the COD income area, courts 
58 Id. at 751-52.  For many years, courts assumed that the bonds in Kirby Lumber had been 
issued for cash, and distinguished Kirby Lumber on that basis.  See cases cited at n.6 of 
Bittker, supra note, 43.  However, as Professor Bittker pointed out in his 1977 article, the 
bonds in Kirby Lumber were not issued for cash.  Id.  The Kirby Lumber opinion states that 
the bonds were issued "at par," but it does not mention the type of consideration given for 
the bonds.  The briefs in the case indicate that the bonds were issued in exchange for the 
issuer's preferred stock, on which there were dividend arrearages.  
The government had asserted in its petition for writ of certiorari that the bonds had 
been issued for cash.  However, the issuer's brief in opposition to the petition for writ of 
certiorari responded by stressing that the bonds were not issued for cash.  The issuer's brief 
indicates that the preferred stock "liability" was $231 per share ($105 plus dividend 
arrearages of $126 per share), and that $11,526,800 in bonds, plus $9,776.94 in cash, was 
exchanged for the preferred stock "at the price of $231 per share."  Id. at 126 and n.9.  After 
certiorari was granted, the government argued, and the issuer agreed, that the type of 
consideration received in exchange for the debt was irrelevant.
Professor Bittker's view is that "having been argued by both parties on the premise 
that the nature of the consideration received for the bonds was irrelevant (and on a record 
that did not address itself to this issue), the case almost certainly was decided on the same 
assumption." Id. at 129.  Professor Bittker's point is that the decision of the Supreme Court 
was not limited to bonds issued for cash, as some courts had interpreted the decision in order 
to distinguish the decision.  Id. at 125 and n.6.  In his view, Kirby Lumber therefore applies 
to bonds whether the bonds were issued for cash or noncash consideration.  Professor 
Bittker's discovery about the noncash consideration received for the bonds in Kirby Lumber
called into question the status of cases such as Rail Joint, which had erroneously 
distinguished Kirby Lumber as a case involving debt issued for cash.
In a later article, Bittker and Thompson criticized the Second Circuit's decision in 
Rail Joint.  Bittker & Thompson, supra note 17, at 1167.  They argued that the transaction in 
Rail Joint could be analogized to a hypothetical cash sale of the bonds, followed by a 
distribution of the cash proceeds as a dividend.  Id.  The subsequent discharge of the debt for 
less than the cash equivalent of the debt at the time of the distribution should, in their view, 
therefore have been taxable. 
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often cited the pre Kirby Lumber case, Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire.59  Citing 
Kerbaugh-Empire in support of a transactional accounting approach to COD income 
was, however, controversial. Kerbaugh-Empire was inconsistent with Burnet v. 
Sanford & Brooks Co., the case in which the Supreme Court had upheld the use of 
an annual accounting period, even where application of the annual accounting period 
arguably resulted in unfair tax treatment of an entire transaction.60 Although 
Kerbaugh-Empire has never been overruled, commentators assume that it is no 
longer good law.61
D. Erosion of the freeing of assets theory and emergence of the loan 
proceeds theory.
In 1978, Bittker & Thompson articulated a new theory of debt discharge.62
Under this approach to COD income, often referred to as a “loan proceeds” theory63
or “symmetry” theory,64 the debtor may exclude loan proceeds from income in the 
year in which they are received because of the offsetting liability to repay the 
principal.  If the debtor later breaks the promise to repay the principal, the failure to 
fully repay the principal is inconsistent with the earlier exclusion and an income
inclusion is warranted.  In other words, the debtor should not be allowed to exclude 
loan proceeds in the year of the borrowing and in the year of the discharge where the 
loan is not repaid.
This approach focuses on the tax benefit of the exclusion of loan proceeds in 
the year of the borrowing, so the facts in that year are relevant.  Under this approach, 
59
 For example, the court, in Rail Joint, cited Kerbaugh-Empire as support for adopting a 
transactional approach to COD income. 61 F.2d at 652 (2d Cir. 1932).
60
 282 U.S. 359 (1931).
61 See, e.g., Joseph M. Dodge, Zarin v. Commissioner, Musings About Debt 
Cancellations and Consumption in an Income Tax Base, 45 T AX L. REV. 677, 678, text at 
n.8 (1990); Seto, supra note 28, at 211.  In Vukasovich, Inc. v. Commissioner, 790 F.2d 
1409 (9th Cir. 1986), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Burnet v. Sanford & 
Brooks precluded application of the earlier transactional approach in Kerbaugh-Empire.
Professor Schenk has also criticized the whole transaction approach on grounds of 
impracticality, since it will often be impractical to attempt to trace the use of the borrowed 
proceeds.  Deborah H. Schenk, The Story of Kirby Lumber: The Many Faces of 
Discharge of Indebtedness Income, in TAX STORIES 97, 106 (Paul Caron ed. 2003).
62
 Bittker & Thompson, supra note 17.
63 See, e.g., Schenk, supra note 61, at 107.
64 See, e.g., Deborah A. Geier, Tufts and the Evolution of Debt Discharge Theory, 1 FLA. 
TAX REV. 115, 145 (1993).
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however, the circumstances in the year of the discharge, such as the debtor's 
insolvency, are irrelevant.65
The consensus among tax commentators is that the loan proceeds approach 
is the correct theoretical approach to debt discharge.66  Commentators characterize 
the freeing of assets theory as "outmoded." 67
In 1980, Congress adopted the loan proceeds approach when it overhauled 
the COD income rules.68  As part of the 1980 Bankrupcy Tax Act,69 Congress 
codified a number of judicial exceptions to COD income.70  One of the issues that 
Congress had to consider was whether debt discharge by an insolvent debtor created 
income.71  Under the case law freeing of assets approach, an insolvent debtor has no 
income from the debt discharge.72 Under the loan proceeds approach to COD
income, however, the debt discharge by an insolvent debtor creates income. 
Congress followed the loan proceeds approach to debt discharges by 
insolvent debtors and did not codify the freeing of assets insolvency exception to 
Kirby Lumber.  Consistent with the loan proceeds theory of COD income, debt 
discharge by an insolvent or bankrupt debtor was thought to create COD income.  
An insolvent or bankrupt debtor is not in a position to pay tax on COD income in the 
year of the discharge, however, so Congress allowed such debtors to defer the tax on 
COD income arising from discharge of their debts.73
Congress provided an exclusion for COD income, to the extent of a debtor's 
insolvency, or for any COD income arising in a bankruptcy proceeding.74  In order 
to tax the debtor on the COD income when the debtor is better able to pay tax (i.e., 
when the debtor starts earning income after it recovers), Congress also provided in § 
108 that the debtor's tax attributes, beginning with the debtor's net operating losses, 
65 Id. at n.8 and 144-56.
66 See, e.g., Schenk, supra note 61, at 104, 107 (“the freeing-of-assets theory has been 
subjected to withering criticism” and the loan proceeds approach is the “better 
approach”).
67 See, e.g., Geier, supra note 64, at 144 (freeing of assets theory is "outmoded").
68 Pub. L. No. 96-589, 94 Stat. 3389, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
69 Id.
70
 For an example of one of these statutory exceptions in the current Code, see I.R.C. § 
108(e)(2) (2000) (no COD income on the discharge of debt to the extent that payment of 
the debt would have given rise to a deduction).
71 See, e.g., Geier, supra note 64, at n.8.
72 See supra note 50.
73 S. REP. NO. 1035, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1980) (not permanently excluding the COD 
income of insolvent debtors, but permitting the debtor to defer the tax on the COD income).
74
 I.R.C. § 108(a) (2000).
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are reduced by the amount of COD income excluded.75  Tax attributes such as net 
operating losses offset the debtor's income in the years after the debt discharge 
(reducing the tax the debtor has to pay), so reducing the debtor's attributes increases
the tax the debtor has to pay in the years after the debt discharge.  The exclusion and 
attribute reduction rules were structured to defer the tax on COD income, instead of 
permanently excluding the COD income, as the case law insolvency exception had 
done.76  Said another way, the loan proceeds approach is a type of timing rule:
Loan proceeds must be taxed at some point in time.
Current law chooses to place the tax event at the point of 
repayment of the principal by excluding the loan proceeds 
from gross income on receipt but taxing the income used to 
repay the principal amount. . . .  Failure to repay the loan 
with after-tax dollars at the back end (which occurs on debt 
discharge) requires, in essence, retroactive taxation at the 
front end.77
There is, however, a stronger version of the loan proceeds approach, which is 
based on the idea that the loan proceeds approach is related in theory to the tax 
benefit rule.78 Under this stronger application of the loan proceeds approach, 
cancellation of indebtedness results in COD income “if the taxpayer would have 
recognized income from the borrowing in the absence of an assumption that the debt 
would be repaid.”79 If, on the other hand, “the taxpayer would not have recognized 
income from the borrowing transaction even if it had been known from the outset 
that the debt would never be repaid,” the discharge of the debt does not result in 
COD income.80
75
 I.R.C. § 108(b) (2000).
76 S. REP. NO. 1035, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1980).  Department of Treasury and Justice 
officials had argued that permitting an insolvent debtor to exclude COD income without 
attribute reduction would give the debtor “a head start rather than a fresh start.”  Paul H. 
Asofsky, Towards a Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1993, 51 N.Y.U. INSTITUTE ON FED. TAX’N
13-1, 13-8  (1993) (citations omitted).
77
 Geier, supra, note 64, at 146.
78 Id. at 147.  Professor Geier discusses the relationship between COD income and the tax 
benefit rule.  
79
 Seto, supra note 28, at 219.  Seto refers to the strong version of the Bittker and 
Thompson approach as the “deferred income approach.”
80 Id.  Professor Seto illustrates this approach with two examples.  The first example 
involves a purchase price adjustment.  The second example involves the facts of 
Commissioner v. Rail Joint, 61 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1932).  Recall that, in Rail Joint, the 
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E. COD income as a transactional error correction device.
Although most commentators agree that the loan proceeds approach is the 
theoretically correct approach to COD income,81 individual commentators have
advocated variations on the whole transaction approach to determine the tax 
consequences of debt discharge. For example, Professor Seto has advocated a form 
of transactional accounting for debt discharge. The starting point is our annual 
system of accounting.82 Annual accounting trumps transactional accounting 
generally.83 We do, however, keep track of certain tax attributes, such as basis84 and 
net operating losses,85 which are carried from year to year. These attributes affect a 
taxpayer’s tax liability in other years. The Internal Revenue Code (the Code) also 
includes some specific rules that require a taxpayer to take into account events in 
other tax years in order to compute the current year’s liability.86 The thesis of 
Professor Seto’s article is: “A taxpayer’s reportable income for tax purposes, 
however measured, ultimately should equal her real income. . . . [T]he rules 
comprising the federal income tax system should, in the aggregate, be interpreted so 
as to account completely for every real item of income or loss.”87 If use of the 
annual accounting period results in an error, a transactional approach should be used 
to correct that error.
debtor corporation issued debt as a dividend on its stock.  The corporation later 
discharged the debt for less than the face amount of the debt.  The court held that the 
discharge did not result in COD income. Rail Joint is often cited as an example of the 
freeing of assets approach to COD.  Professor Seto argues that the result in Rail Joint is 
also consistent with the deferred income approach to COD, because there would have 
been no inclusion in the year in which the debt was issued if it had been known at that 
time that the full amount of the debt would not be repaid.  Id. at 220.  Professor Geier 
also cites Rail Joint as a case in which the debt discharge did not create COD because the 
borrowing did not result in the debtor receiving untaxed loan proceeds.  Geier, supra note 
64, at 148.
81 See, e.g., Schenk, supra note 61, at 104, 107.  Professor Schenk calls the loan proceeds 
approach the “better approach,” after noting the severe criticism leveled against the 
freeing of assets theory.  Id.
82
 I.R.C. § 441 (2000).
83 Burnet v. Sanford and Brooks, 282 U.S. 359 (1931).
84
 I.R.C. §§ 1012, 1011, 1016 (2000).
85
 I.R.C. § 172 (2000).
86 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 104(a) (2000), which requires taxpayers to consider medical 
expenses deducted under I.R.C. § 213 in prior years, in determining the excludability of 
personal injury recoveries.
87
 Seto, supra note 28, at 227.  Professor Seto refers to this principle as “the principle of 
complete accounting.” 
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Professor Seto acknowledges that the complete accounting principle ignores 
base-definition, timing, and valuation issues.88 In addition, the Internal Revenue 
Code includes numerous rules that preclude precise application of the complete 
accounting principle in specific circumstances. For example, net operating losses 
expire if they are not utilized within the number of years specified in § 172.89
Professor Seto argues, nonetheless, that the principle of complete accounting is “an 
interpretive rule of general applicability.”90
The Bittker and Thompson loan proceeds approach is a particular type of 
error correction device. In the simplest form, the loan proceeds rule says that debt 
that is excluded in the year of the borrowing and is not repaid must be included in 
income in the year of the discharge. The stronger form of the loan proceeds 
approach would require inclusion in most, but not all cases. In the year in which the 
debt is discharged, it requires that we ask whether the loan proceeds would have 
been included in income, in the year in which the debt was incurred, if it had been 
known at that time that the loan would not be repaid. If the exclusion in the year of 
the borrowing is dependent on the assumption that the loan would be repaid, the 
discharge results in COD income. If the exclusion in the year of the borrowing is 
not dependent on the assumption that the loan would be repaid, the discharge does 
not result in COD income. 
Under this approach to COD income, the error to be corrected is the 
erroneous exclusion of the loan proceeds in the year of the borrowing. This 
approach considers facts in another annual accounting period (the year of the 
borrowing), but it does not consider the transaction as a whole. Professor Seto 
argues that even the stronger form of the Bittker and Thompson approach can be
inadequate precisely because it fails to take into account events that occurred while 
the loan was outstanding.91
Against this backdrop of the development of the general theories of debt 
discharge, the next part of this Article tracks the development of the specific tax 
rules that apply to the discharge of debt in a debt-for-debt or stock-for-debt 
exchange.  Part III illustrates the application of the general COD income theories in 
debt-for-debt and stock-for-debt exchanges, and highlights the connection between 
the COD income rules and OID rules applicable in these transactions.
88 Id. at 228.
89
 Under current law, net operating losses may generally be carried back two years and
forward twenty years.  I.R.C. § 172(b)(1)(A) (2000).
90
 Seto, supra note 28, at 228.
91 Id. at 221-22.
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III. COD INCOME IN DEBT-FOR-DEBT AND STOCK-FOR-DEBT EXCHANGES.
A. Case law and the substitution of liabilities theory.
As noted earlier, our tax system draws various distinctions between debt and 
equity. A corporation can deduct interest paid or accrued on its debt but cannot 
deduct the dividends it pays on the its stock.92  A corporation does not have to 
include in income the proceeds from its issuance of debt. If a corporation retires 
debt for less than the amount owed on the debt, however, the corporation has 
COD income in an amount equal to the difference between the amount owed on 
the debt and the amount paid to discharge the debt.93  A corporation does not have 
income when it receives cash or other property in exchange for its stock.94  If the 
corporation later repurchases the stock for less than the amount for which the 
stock was issued, the corporation has no income. 95
Early case law established the stock-for-debt and debt-for-debt exceptions to 
COD income.96 The theory articulated in these cases is generally a substitution of 
liabilities theory. 
The converse of these debt discharge cases were cases in which the issue 
was whether a corporation could deduct unstated interest on corporate debt issued in 
exchange for the corporation’s stock.97  Until 1969, it was unclear whether a 
corporation could deduct unstated interest on debt issued in exchange for property.98
The issue was thought to be particularly problematic where debt was issued in 
exchange for the corporation’s stock.99
92
 I.R.C. § 163(a)(2000).
93 See I.R.C. § 61(a)(12) (2000).
94
 I.R.C.  § 1032(a) (2000). For a discussion of I.R.C.  §  1032, see BORIS I. BITTKER & 
JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND THEIR 
SHAREHOLDERS ¶ 3.12[1], page 3-67 to 65 (7th ed. 2000, with 2002 Supp.).
95
 See I.R.C.  § 311(a) (2000).  Section 1032(a) provides that a corporation does not 
recognize gain or loss on the issuance of stock in exchange from property.  Treasury 
Regulations provide that § 1032 does not apply to a corporation's acquisition of its own 
shares unless the corporation acquires the shares in exchange for its own stock (although 
the regulation cross-references the § 311 regulations).  See Treas. Reg. § 1.1032-1(b).  
Section 311(a) provides that a corporation does not recognize gain on the distribution of 
property with respect to its stock. See I.R.C §  311(a) (2000).  Property includes cash 
under I.R.C. § 317(a).  See id. § 317(a) (2000).
96 See infra Part III.A.2. and 3.
97 See infra in Part III.A.1.
98 Id.
99 Id.
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1. The creation of deductible discount in debt-for-stock exchanges and 
debt-for-debt exchanges.
As early as 1934, the Supreme Court recognized that debt discount (what we 
refer to today as OID)100 represents an additional cost of borrowing.101  In the period 
before 1969, the issuer of a debt instrument with OID was allowed to deduct the 
interest on straight line basis over the life of the bonds.102  However, cash basis 
bondholders were not required to include the OID in income until the bonds were 
sold or retired.103  Neither the Code nor the regulations provided specific rules for 
determining the OID on debt issued in exchange for property.104
At that time, it was not clear whether a corporation could create deductible 
discount by issuing debt in exchange for its stock.  The government had several 
concerns about allowing deductions for discount where the discount bonds were 
issued in exchange for property.105  First, the government was concerned about the 
100 See supra note 8.
101
 Helvering v. Union Pacific Railroad, 293 U.S. 282 (1934).  The opinion in the case 
created some confusion regarding the rationale for the deductibility of debt discount.  It was 
not clear from the opinion whether the Court thought the discount was deductible as unstated 
interest or as a loss.  However, the Court, in United States v. Midland Ross Corp., made it 
clear that the discount was viewed as unstated interest.  The Supreme Court stated:  "Earned 
original issue discount serves the same function as stated interest . . . .  [I]t is simply 
'compensation for the use or forbearance of money.'"  381 U.S. 54, 57 (1965) (citing Deputy 
v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488 (1940)).
102 See James S. Eustice, The Tax Reform Act of 1969: Corporations and Corporate 
Investors, 25 TAX L. REV. 509, 532 (1970) [hereinafter Eustice, Tax Reform Act of 1969].  
Note that this typically allowed the issuer to overstate its OID deductions in the early years 
that the debt was outstanding.  If OID accrues on a yield-to-maturity basis, the OID 
deductions in the early years should be less than straight line deductions would be and the 
OID deductions in the later years should be more than the straight line deductions would be.  
Peter C. Canellos & Edward D. Kleinbard, The Miracle of Compound Interest: Interest 
Deferral and Discount After 1982, 38 TAX L. REV. 565, 568 (1983).
103
 In United States v. Midland-Ross Corp., 381 U.S. 54, 57 (1965), the Supreme Court held 
that OID realized by a bondholder on the sale or retirement of a bond was ordinary income, 
not capital gain.  Eustice, Tax Reform Act of 1969, supra, note 102, at 532, notes that 
bondholders were prone to forget that all or a part of the gain on the sale or retirement of the 
bonds was ordinary income instead of capital gain.
104
 Section 1232(b)(1) (repealed).  Treas. Reg. § 1.1232-3(b)(2) provided several specific 
Issue Price rules for debt issued in exchange for cash, but was silent regarding the Issue 
Price of debt issued for property.
105
 W.J. Rockler et al., Status of Amortizable Bond Discount After National Alfalfa Case, 41 
J. TAX'N 134 (1974).
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asymmetrical treatment for issuers and bondholders described above.106  Second, the 
government was concerned that the quantification of the discount would pose 
difficult valuation questions where the debt was issued for property.107  The 
government feared it would be "whipsawed" if the bondholders either argued for a 
higher valuation (reducing the OID they would have to include) or failed to include 
the full amount of discount in income as ordinary income.108
The government had additional concerns where the debt was issued in a 
reorganization.  If the new debt was issued in exchange for the issuing 
corporation's stock, allowing the corporation to deduct the unstated interest on the 
new debt would allow the corporation to convert its nondeductible cost of equity 
capital into deductible interest, at no tax cost to the corporation.109 If the new 
debt was issued in exchange for debt that had declined in value since issuance, 
allowing the corporation to deduct the difference between the face amount of the 
new debt and the value of the old debt would allow the corporation to convert 
nondeductible market discount into deductible discount. The government 
therefore took the position in litigation that deductible discount did not arise where 
debt was issued in exchange for property, especially where the property was the 
stock of the issuer.110 Issuers took the contrary position.111
Some courts held that discount could arise in a debt-for-property 
transaction.112 In order to determine whether, in a specific transaction, the 
issuance of debt in exchange for property created discount, courts also had to 
determine the Issue Price of the debt issued for property.113 This was 
controversial where the debt was issued in exchange for the issuer’s stock. Courts 
106 Id. at 134.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109
 This was a concern in Commissioner v. National Alfalfa Dehydrating & Milling Co., 
417 U.S. 134, 142 (1974).
110 See, e.g., Atchison, Topeka & Sante Fe Railroad, 443 F.2d 147 (10th Cir. 1971).
111 Id.
112 Id.  The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that discount could arise from debt-for-
property transactions.  The court noted that the regulations did not distinguish between 
bonds issued for cash and bonds issued for property, and concluded that the regulations 
acknowledged the economic possibility that discount could arise in exchanges of bonds for 
property. See also American Smelting and Refining Co. v. United States, 130 F.2d 883 (3d 
Cir. 1942) (issuer could deduct discount arising from the exchange of new debt for the 
preferred stock of its subsidiary).
113
 Original issue discount equals the stated redemption price at maturity of the debt 
instrument over the issue price of the instrument.  I.R.C. § 1273(a)(1) (2000). Under 
current law, the issue price is determined under §§ 1273(b) and 1274. These rules did not 
exist at the time these cases were decided.
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developed several different approaches for determining the Issue Price of debt 
issued for property.  Some courts said that the Issue Price of the new debt was the 
consideration originally received for the stock.114  Other courts said that the Issue 
Price of the new debt was the greater of the consideration originally received for 
the stock or the value of the stock at the time of the exchange.115 Still another 
approach was to look only to the value of the stock at the time of the exchange.116
114 In Erie Lackawanna Railroad Co. v. United States, 422 F.2d 425 (1970), the Court of 
Claims held that no discount arose on the exchange of new $100 face debt for preferred 
stock, with a value of $81, for which the issuer had received $100 when it was issued.  
The court denied the issuer's discount deduction because it concluded that the amount to 
be used as the Issue Price of the new debt, for purposes of computing the discount on the 
new debt, was the $100 consideration the issuer originally received for the stock, not the 
$81 value of the stock on the date of the exchange.  Therefore, the court concluded that 
there was no discount on the new debt.  The court said that the value of the preferred on 
the date of the exchange was irrelevant.  This decision left open the possibility that 
discount could arise where the face of the new debt exceeded the amount of consideration 
originally received for the stock.
The Court of Claims later modified its Erie Lackawanna original consideration 
Issue Price approach when it reconsidered Missouri Pacific Railroad, 433 F.2d 1324 (1970), 
modifying 427 F.2d 727 (1970).  There, the Court of Claims adopted the "two-tier" Issue 
Price approach used by the district court in Cities Service Co. v. United States, 316 F. Supp. 
61, 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), supplemental opinions, 330 F. Supp. 421 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), 362 F. 
Supp. 830 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 522 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1974).  Under that approach, the 
Issue Price of the new debt is the greater of (1) the consideration originally received for the 
stock, or (2) the value of the stock on the date of the exchange.  Id. at 430.  One group of 
commentators concluded the following, regarding the change in approach:
The inference is almost irresistible that the Court of Claims began 
to realize the troublesome implications of its original position.  
Under the Erie decision, a corporation that issued a $50 bond for a 
share of preferred stock, originally issued for $30 per share but 
worth $50 per share at the time of the exchange, would be entitled 
to claim discount of $20 per bond, although there was no cost of 
borrowing other than the stated interest rate.  In order to prevent 
such an unwarranted result, the Court of Claims simply combined 
its original rule with another altogether different rule.
Rockler et al, supra note 105, at 135.
115 Cities Service Co. v. United States, 316 F. Supp. 61, 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), supplemental 
opinions, 330 F. Supp. 421 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), 362 F. Supp. 830 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 522 
F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1974).
116
 Although the Tenth Circuit adopted this approach in Commissioner v. National Alfalfa 
Dehydrating & Milling Co., 472 F.2d 796 (10th Cir. 1973), the Supreme Court rejected this 
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The issue eventually reached the Supreme Court, in Commissioner v. 
National Alfalfa Dehydrating & Milling Co.117  In 1957, National Alfalfa had 
exchanged new $50 face 5% sinking fund debentures118 for outstanding $50 par 5% 
cumulative sinking fund preferred stock.  At the time of the exchange, the preferred 
shares were thinly traded in the over-the-counter market.  The issuer had taken the 
position that the value of the preferred at the time of the exchange was $33, so the 
Issue Price of the new debt was also $33 and the issuer was entitled to deduct $17 of 
OID ($50 stated redemption price less $33 Issue Price) on the new debt.  The 
Service disallowed the OID deduction.  The Tax Court held for the Service,119 but 
the Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that National Alfalfa was entitled to the OID 
deductions.120
The Supreme Court held that National Alfalfa was not entitled to deduct the 
discount.  However, the precise rationale for the Court's holding is somewhat 
ambiguous.  The Court seemed comfortable with the notion of a corporation 
deducting a discount arising from the issuance of debt for cash, but seemed troubled 
by the notion of a corporation exchanging new debt "for its own outstanding 
preferred stock."121
In part III of the opinion, the Court rejected the taxpayer's argument that the 
debt for stock exchange should be treated as though the debt had been issued for 
cash in an amount equal to the value of the preferred stock, and the hypothetical cash 
proceeds had been used to retire the preferred stock (the approach used by the Tenth 
Circuit).  The Court said that it was rejecting the taxpayer's argument for two 
reasons.  First, the Court said that the taxpayer should be bound by the actual form 
of the transaction.  Second, the Court expressed concern that the value of the 
preferred stock had not been conclusively established.122 In this part of the opinion, 
approach.  417 U.S. 134 (1974).
117 417 U.S. 134 (1974).
118
 A debenture is a type of debt security. It is typically an unsecured debt obligation.  
ROBERT W. HAMILTON & RICHARD A. BOOTH, BUSINESS BASICS FOR LAW STUDENTS: 
ESSENTIAL CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS 293 (2002).
119
 57 T.C. 46 (1971).
120
 472 F.2d 796 (1973).
121
 417 U.S. at 142.  The Court seemed disturbed by the idea that a company could "create" 
deductible discount by substituting a debt liability for an existing stock liability.  This 
concern would of course be more pronounced if the Issue Price of the new debt is based on 
the fluctuating value of the stock, because under that rule the issuer could time the exchange 
to coincide with a low value for the stock, creating even more discount on the exchange.
122 The Court said that it would not speculate as to the value of the preferred stock for three 
reasons.  First, the Court said that there was nothing in the record to establish the cash price 
at which the debentures could have been sold, if they had been sold on the open market.  
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the Court seemed to indicate that discount on debt issued in debt-for-property 
exchanges could be deducted if the issuer established the value of the property 
exchanged for the debt.
In part IV of the Court's opinion, however, the Court said that discount can 
arise only where debt is issued in an exchange in which the issuer incurs "some cost 
or expense of acquiring the use of capital."123  The Court concluded that the 
exchange did not cause the corporation to acquire any new capital (because it did not 
increase the corporate assets), or any additional cost to retain the old capital.  The 
Court noted that the terms of the old preferred and the new debt were "highly 
equivalent"124 and said that National Alfalfa's "cost of capital" "was the same 
whether represented by the preferred or by the debentures."125  Therefore, the Court 
concluded that the "substitution" of the debt for the preferred stock "did not create an 
obligation to pay in excess of an amount previously committed, or establish a base 
upon which debt discount can arise."126
Tax commentators criticized the "cost of capital" analysis in Part IV of the 
National Alfalfa opinion because it treated debt and equity as equivalent for tax 
purposes.127 Courts nonetheless continued to cite the National Alfalfa substitution of 
Second, The Court said that nothing in the record established that National Alfalfa would 
have been able to purchase all of its preferred stock on the open market, or at what price the 
stock could have been repurchased.  Third, the Court said that when a corporation exchanges 
its newly issued debt for the preferred stock of its own shareholders, the claimed value of 
both securities is "somewhat artificial since the exchange is effectively insulated from 
market forces by the intracorporate and private nature of the transaction."  Id. at 151.
123 Id. at 147.
124 Id at 155.  The 5% interest on the debt equaled the 5% cumulative dividend on the 
preferred.  The face amount of the debt equaled the par value of the stock, and the preferred 
stock and the debt had comparable sinking fund provisions.
125 Id. at 155.
126 Id.  The Supreme Court, at note 11 of its opinion, said that National Alfalfa "incurred no 
additional obligation because of the substitution of its debentures for its preferred," although 
the Court acknowledged that, when National Alfalfa issued its debt, it "assumed a fixed 
obligation to pay at a date certain," unlike the obligation to pay dividends on the stock.  The 
Court, at note 12, said that it, in the past, had noted that "the investment difference between 
preferred shares and unsecured debentures can be of slight degree, and it is further 
diminished when, as here, the debentures are subordinated."
127 See, e.g., Rockler et al, supra note 105, at 137 (“[W]hile the economic differences 
between debt and stock interests in a corporation may for some purposes be minor and while 
classification may be difficult, classification is essential and must be made under the tax 
laws because tax consequences differ in myriad areas depending on whether an instrument is 
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liabilities rationale.128  On the other hand, some courts applying National Alfalfa
interpreted part IV of the opinion narrowly. They did not read National Alfalfa as 
saying that discount could not arise on the issuance of debt in exchange for the 
issuer's stock.129
Conflicts arose in the case law regarding the possibility of discount arising 
on the issuance of new debt in exchange for the issuer's preferred stock, and the 
method to be used to determine the Issue Price of the new debt.  In 1969, Congress 
"clarified" both issues as part of the 1969 Act.130
2. The creation of COD income in debt-for-debt exchanges.
Courts also adopted a substitution of liabilities approach for purposes of 
determining COD income in debt-for-debt exchanges.131 If old debt was discharged 
in exchange for new debt with the same face amount payable at maturity, there was 
no COD income in the exchange. If, on the other hand, the face amount of the new 
debt was less than the face amount of the old debt, the debtor corporation had COD 
income in an amount equal to the reduction in the face amount of the debt.132  Said 
another way, the new debt was treated as a continuation of the old debt to the extent 
of the face amount of the new debt. The value of the old debt at the time of the 
exchange was not thought to be relevant for purposes of determining the COD 
income on the exchange. 
For example, in Commissioner v. Coastwise Transportation Corp.,133 the 
debtor corporation issued $375,000 of new debt in exchange for old debt, with a 
face amount of $456,300. The Court of Appeals held that the debtor corporation 
had COD income from the exchange, in an amount equal to the reduction in the 
face amount of the debt.134 Other courts followed this substitution of liabilities 
approach in debt-for-debt exchanges.135
considered debt or equity for tax purposes.”).  Id.
128 See, e.g., United States Steel Corp. v. United States, 848 F.2d 1232 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
129 See, e.g., Cities Service Co. v. United States, 522 F.2d 1281 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. 
denied, 423 U.S. 827 (1975) (exchange of new debt for old stock did give rise to deductible 
discount, in spite of National Alfalfa).
130
 The 1969 Act changes in the OID rules are described infra at  Part III.B.1.
131 See, e.g., Commissioner v. Coastwise Transportation Corp., 71 F.2d 104 (1st Cir.), 
cert. denied, 293 U.S. 595 (1934).
132 Id.
133 Id.
134
 71 F.2d at 105-06.
135 See, e.g., United States v. Little War Creek Coal Co., 104 F.2d 483 (4th Cir. 1939); 
Commissioner v. Stanley Co., 185 F.2d 979 (2d Cir. 1951).
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The Supreme Court later applied a slightly different substitution of liabilities 
approach to debt-for-debt exchanges in Great Western Power Co. of California v. 
Commissioner.136 The issue in Great Western Power was whether the retirement of 
debt in a debt-for-debt exchange could create bond retirement premium, which is the 
opposite of COD income.137  The new debt issued in the exchange had the same face 
amount as the old debt for which it was exchanged. The issuer also paid cash to the 
bondholders in the exchange.  The issuer took the position that the cash premium 
was immediately deductible as bond retirement premium. The Supreme Court, 
applying the substitution of liabilities approach, held that retirement premium from 
the discharge of the old debt at a premium could not be deducted in the year of the 
exchange, but must instead be amortized over the life of the new debt issued in the 
exchange.138  Before adopting the substitution of liabilities approach, the Court 
considered and rejected a hypothetical cash issuance model.  Following the decision 
in Great Western Power Co., some issuers took the position that they did not have 
COD income in a debt-for-debt exchange, even where the face amount of new debt 
issued was less than the face amount of the old debt discharged.139
In 1977, the Service issued Revenue Ruling 77-437,140 which clarified its
position on the potential conflict between the rules articulated in Coastwise 
Transportation and Great Western Power Co.  The Service ruled that the decision in 
Great Western Power Co. did not prevent the creation of COD income in a debt-for-
debt recapitalization if the face amount of the new debt was less than the face 
amount of the old debt. In such a case, the corporate issuer had COD income in an 
amount equal to the reduction in the face amount of the debt. The Service agreed
with the substitution of liabilities approach, but treated the debt as retired to the 
extent of the reduction in the face amount of the debt.141
136 297 U.S. 543 (1936).
137 Bond retirement premium, which is deductible by the issuer, is the amount the issuer pays 
to retire debt less the amount owed on the debt retired. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-4(c)(1).  If the 
old debt is retired for cash, the premium is deductible in the year the debt is retired. Id.
138
 297 U.S. at 546-47.
139
 Gary B. Wilcox, Issuing Mixed Consideration in Troubled Debt Restructurings, 10 
VA. TAX REV. 357, 377 (1990)
140
 1977-2 C.B. 28.
141
 See also GCM 36602 (March 1, 1976).  In a subsequent technical advice memorandum, 
the Service articulated the theory behind its approach:
Neither the Code [n]or the regulations nor case law 
provide for increasing income from a discharge of indebtedness 
resulting from an exchange of debt instruments because the fair 
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3. The creation of COD income in stock-for-debt exchanges.
Courts also adopted a substitution of liabilities approach to determine 
whether a corporate issuer had COD income on the issuance of its stock in 
exchange for its outstanding debt. For example, in Capento Securities Corp. v. 
Commissioner,142 the court viewed stock as a form of "liability," and concluded 
that the discharge of debt in exchange for preferred stock did not create COD
income.143 In Capento Securities Corp., Raytheon in 1935 issued 5,000 shares of 
$100 par value 6% noncumulative preferred stock to Capento in exchange for 
bonds with a face amount of $500,000.144  At the time of the exchange, the new 
stock was worth only $50,000.145  The Commissioner argued that Raytheon 
realized $450,000 of COD income from the discharge of the bonds.146
The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA)147 rejected the Commissioner’s 
argument.  The BTA concluded that the substitution of the debtor’s “capital stock 
liability” for its bond did not result in the realization of gain.148  The court 
distinguished such a substitution of liabilities from the discharge of debt for 
cash.149  The court also articulated an alternative rationale for its holding.  The 
bonds were terminated, but the court said that the consideration originally 
received for the bonds could be thought of as the subscription price for the new 
stock.150  Corporations do not have income on the receipt of the subscription price 
for stock,151 so Raytheon realized no COD income on the exchange.152
market value of the instruments is less than their face value.  
Rather, the courts, in the cases cited, look to the reduction of 
taxpayers' liabilities and the corresponding shrinkage of assets to 
determine income.  The fact that the fair market value of debt 
instruments may be less than their face does not lessen the 
issuer's financial obligation.  The issuer of the debt instruments 
remains obligated for the face value of the instrument upon the 
maturity date of the instrument regardless of the fair market 
value of the instrument.
TAM 7752002 (Sept. 2, 1977).
142
 47 B.T.A. 691, aff'd, 140 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1942).
143
 47 B.T.A. at 695.
144
 47 B.T.A. at 694-95.
145 Id. at 695.
146 Id.
147
 The Board of Tax Appeals was the predecessor of the United States Tax Court.
148 Id. The court cited the freeing of assets rationale in support of this conclusion.  Id.
149 Id.  
150 Id.
151
 I.R.C. § 1032 (2000).
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In Motor Mart Trust v. Commissioner,153 the court extended the 
substitution of liabilities rationale of Capento Securities to the issuance of a 
package of common and preferred stock in exchange for the debt of an insolvent 
company.  In Motor Mart Trust, the court concluded that the exchange of new 
common and preferred stock for debt was not a “cancellation” of debt.154  The 
court noted that, by the time of the exchange, the bondholders had become the de 
facto owners of the company.  The exchange merely formalized the prior 
conversion of the bondholders into shareholders, so the court did not think that the 
exchange resulted in the realization of COD income.155
Tax commentators have criticized the substitution of liabilities rationale 
for the stock-for-debt exception to COD income, because debt and equity are, for 
many tax purposes, not treated as equivalent sources of capital.156 Commentators 
152 Id.
153
 4 T.C. 931, aff’d, 156 F.2d 122 (1st Cir. 1946).
154
 156 F. 2d at 127.  At the time of the case, federal bankruptcy law required debtors to 
reduce their basis in property by the amount of debt cancelled in a bankruptcy 
proceeding, so courts also had to determine whether a stock-for-debt exchange was a 
“cancellation” that triggered such attribute reduction. Bankruptcy Act of 1938, § 270, as 
amended by the Chandler Act, 52 Stat. 904 (repealed).
155
 156 F. 2d at 124:
At the date of the reorganization the equity of the old 
shareholders had vanished, and in substance the bondholders 
were the owners of the company.  This situation was merely 
given formal recognition under the plan of reorganization 
whereby the interests of the old shareholders were extinguished 
and the bondholders changed their status to that of shareholders 
in the reorganized company.  It would be economic nonsense to 
say that the taxpayer thereby made a present realization of 
taxable gain when the bonds were retired. 
Id.
156
 For example, Timothy Sherck observed:
That this rationale is not entirely satisfactory is an 
understatement. . . .  Even when preferred stock like that in 
Capento Securities is involved, the debtor’s position after the 
exchange seems quite different from what it was before.  While 
stock is not always easily distinguishable from debt, it is clear 
that the two concepts differ greatly for tax purposes.  At a 
minimum, debt must consist of an obligation to pay an 
ascertainable sum at a definite time, enforceable against the 
[debtor] by a lawsuit to collect payments.  If rights to dividend 
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have also criticized the alternative subscription price rationale for the stock-for-
debt exception.  For example, Ken Kies has argued that the subscription price 
theory “ignores the plain economics of the exchange:”157
Only pre-existing creditors, and not new shareholders, 
would have to ‘pay” that subscription premium for the 
debtor’s stock, because of their status as creditors. . . .  
[M]ost creditors would indeed be surprised to learn that 
money they have advanced to a corporation in a 
nonconvertible loan transaction was a ‘prepaid subscription 
price for stock to be issued at an undetermined time in the 
future.’158
Some commentators have argued that the subscription price rationale for 
the stock-for-debt exception is a stronger rationale than the substitution of 
liabilities rationale, especially where the debtor corporation is insolvent.159  These 
commentators have noted that the subscription price rationale is consistent with 
what happens in a stock-for-debt exchange that is part of a bankruptcy 
restructuring.160
payments or stock are defaulted, on the other hand, the equity 
holder may be accorded rights to elect directors, perhaps even 
take control of the corporation, but has no ability to sue to 
enforce payment or place the corporation into bankruptcy.  A 
shift from status as a creditor to that of a preferred, to say 
nothing of a common, stockholder thus effects a real and 
substantial change in the relationship between the corporation 
and its former debtholder, and effects an immediate increase in 
corporate net worth.
Timothy C. Sherck, Restructuring Today’s Financially Troubled Corporation, 68 TAXES 
881, 895 (1990).
157
 Kenneth J. Kies, Taking a Fresh Look at the Stock-for-Debt Exception, 56 TAX NOTES 
1619, 1622 (1992).
158 Id. (citation omitted).
159 See, e.g., Sherck, supra note 156, at 896 (subscription price rationale is a more 
satisfactory rationale than the substitution of liabilities rationale and is especially 
applicable to restructurings of troubled companies).
160 Id.  Sherck notes that the subscription price rationale for the stock-for-debt exception 
to COD income:
fits particularly well in the financially troubled company context.  
The principle is well established that where the debtor is 
insolvent, the creditors have become, in effect, involuntary 
equity holders, and should be treated as such for continuity of 
interest purposes.  Similarly, it does not seem too much of a 
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B. The gradual adoption of a hypothetical cash issuance model in 
stock-for-debt and debt-for-debt exchanges.
Courts that adopted the substitution of liabilities or subscription price 
theory in debt-for-stock, debt-for-debt, and stock-for-debt exchanges rejected the
argument that the tax consequences of the exchange should be governed by a 
hypothetical cash issuance approach.161  Over time, however, Congress has 
replaced the substitution of liabilities approach with the hypothetical cash 
issuance approach.
As Congress reconsidered the tax treatment of debt discharge, it also 
considered the ways in which the COD income rules interacted with the OID 
rules, especially the rules that governed the amount of discount created on the 
issuance of debt in exchange for property.  Prior to 1969, the rules governing the 
creation of OID on bonds issued in exchange for property, especially the debtor’s 
debt or stock, were not clear.162  In 1969, Congress overhauled the OID rules to 
“clarify” the tax treatment of such debt.163  As Congress amended the OID rules, 
the interaction of the OID and COD income rules became more complex.  
1. Reform of the OID rules and the determination of COD income in 
debt-for-debt exchanges.
Section 413 of the 1969 Act164 amended Code § 1232 to provide express 
rules for determining the Issue Price of debt issued in exchange for property.165  As 
amended, § 1232(b)(2) provided that the Issue Price of debt issued in a 
logical stretch in such a case to treat the creditors, for purposes 
of determining COD income, as having acquired the equity 
interest in a Section 1032 exchange at some earlier undefined 
point in time.  The ‘formalization’ of their equity position by the 
actual exchange of debt for stock thus would not require 
recognition of gain to the debtor.
Id. (citations omitted).
161 See, e.g., Capento Securities Corp. v. Commissioner, 140 F.2d 382, 386-87 (1st Cir. 
1942).
162 See supra Part III.A.1.
163 Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172 § 413, 83 Stat. 487, 611 (1969) (applicable 
to bonds issued after May 27, 1969).
164 Id.
165
 Section 413 also added Code section 1232(a)(3), which for the first time required 
bondholders to include OID ratably over the life of the debt instrument.  This provision was 
enacted to stop the mismatching of OID deductions and inclusions.  See Eustice, Tax Reform 
Act of 1969,  supra note 102, at 533.
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reorganization is its stated redemption price.166  Under this rule, debt issued in a 
reorganization could never have OID, because the Issue Price of the debt would 
equal the stated redemption price at maturity of the debt.167  This seemingly harsh 
provision was ameliorated by Treasury Regulation § 1.1232-3(b)(1)(iv), which 
provided for the carryover of unamortized OID on a debt instrument given up in 
exchange for the new debt.  The OID carryover rule applied regardless of whether 
the stated redemption price at maturity of the new debt differed from that of the old 
debt, so the rule could produce anomalous results.168
The reason for this special reorganization rule can be gleaned from the 
legislative history of the 1969 Act.169  The special reorganization Issue Price rule 
was not included in the first draft of the Issue Price provision that was adopted by 
the House and Senate Committees.  The first draft of the Issue Price rule provided 
that the Issue Price of any debt issued in exchange for property would be the value 
of the property given up in the exchange if either the debt or the property was traded.  
However, the provision was amended, at the request of the Treasury Department, 
during the Senate debate of the Bill.170  Once again the Treasury Department was 
concerned that it might be "whipsawed" on valuations of property exchanged for 
debt,171 so the Issue Price rule was amended to include the special reorganization 
166
 Section 1232(b)(2) provided that the Issue Price of debt issued for property is: 
(1) the value of the property exchanged for the debt, if
(a) the debt issued is traded or if the debt is issued for stock or securities 
that are traded, and
(b) the debt is not issued in a reorganization; or
(2) the stated redemption price at maturity.
167
 OID equals the stated redemption price of the debt less the Issue Price of the debt.  
I.R.C. § 1273(a)(1) (2000).  
168
 Haims, Restructuring the Debt of the Sick Company, unpublished paper delivered at The 
Tax Club (Jan. 16, 1990), at n.20 (copy on file with the author).
169
 For a discussion of the origin of this rule, see Charles L. Almond, Note, The Original 
Issue Discount Deduction in Bonds-for-Noncash Property Exchanges, 27 VAND. L. REV. 
1179, 1207 (1974) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 413 (Part 2), 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 86 (1969); S. 
REP. NO. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 148 (1969)).  See also David P. Hariton, 
Recapitalizations: The Issuer's Treatment, 40 TAX L. REV. 873 (1987).
170 Id. (citing 115 Cong. Rec. 36730-31 (1969)).
171 Id. at 1207, 1208 (citing 115 CONG. REC. 35730 (1969)).  The Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of the Treasury described the problem in the following way:
The issuing corporation will claim a low value for property 
received on issuance of its bonds in order to obtain a bond discount 
amortization deduction.  The bondholder will claim that the 
property was worth the full face amount of the bonds so he has no 
'original issue discount' income.  It is not possible to bring these 
parties together in a lawsuit, or otherwise to insure that consistent 
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rule.  In other words, the special reorganization rule was probably adopted for 
practical, not theoretical, reasons.
The special reorganization Issue Price rule eliminated the OID valuation 
whipsaw problem, but it created another problem.  Under the special rule, the Issue 
Price of debt issued in reorganizations equaled the face of the debt.  Although this 
eliminated OID on the debt, it arguably created amortizable bond retirement 
premium in some situations where the new debt was issued in exchange for old debt.  
Issuers took the position that they could deduct the difference between the face of 
the new debt (which was also the Issue Price of the debt) and the Adjusted Issue 
Price of old debt exchanged for the new debt, as bond retirement premium.172
Holders of the new debt, on the other hand, argued that they there was no OID to 
include in income, so once again issuers and holders were taking asymmetrical 
positions.  If the value of the new debt was less than the Adjusted Issue Price of the 
old debt, the retirement premium was artificial.173
Due to this disparate treatment, a market developed for exchanges of new 
deferred interest debentures for old debentures, much to the dismay of the 
government.174 The Treasury Department reacted, and the Issue Price rules were 
valuations are applied, so that if one party gets an ordinary 
deduction, the other has an equivalent amount of ordinary income.  
This would suggest that there should be no original issue discount 
where bonds are issued for property except where the bonds are 
traded on an established securities market or are issued for property 
which consists of property so traded.
Id.
172 See, e.g., Canellos & Kleinbard, supra note 102, at 601-09, (discussing the issuer's 
arguments for the deduction, with examples of these transactions, such as the Exxon 
Shipping debt-for-debt exchange).
173
 Here is an example of how this problem could arise:  An issuer exchanges a new 
deferred interest note, with low stated interest, for old debt with a higher stated interest.  
The old debt was originally issued for $1,000 and has a value of $900 at the time of the 
exchange.  The new debt has a face and Issue Price of $1,200.  The value of the new debt 
at the time of the exchange is $900.  The holder took the position that there was no OID 
on the new debt, so would not include the deferred interest on the debt.  On the other 
hand, the issuer took the position it could deduct $200 (the $1,200 Issue Price of the new 
debt less the $1,000 Adjusted Issue Price of the old debt) ratably over the life of the new 
debt.  The retirement premium, created by inflating the Issue Price of the new debt to 
equal the face of the debt, is artificial because the value of the new debt is less than the 
Adjusted Issue Price of the old debt. Example from Haims, supra note 168, at n.22.
174
 Almond, supra note 169, at 1208.   See also Canellos & Kleinbard, supra note 102, at 
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again changed in 1982 to eliminate this perceived abuse. The 1982 Act175 deleted 
the special reorganization rule from § 1232(b)(2), but added new § 1232(b)(4), 
which provided that the Issue Price of debt issued for debt in a reorganization (where 
either the debt or the property for which it was issued was publicly traded) was the 
greater of the fair market value of the old debt or the Adjusted Issue Price of the old 
debt.176
The legislative history of this provision indicates that § 1232(b)(4) was 
enacted to eliminate the artificial bond retirement premium that issuers were 
deducting ratably (but holders were not including) under pre-1982 Act law.  Section 
1232(b)(4), by changing the reorganization Issue Price rule, allowed the creation of 
OID on the debt issued in the reorganization.  The issuer's OID deductions would 
accrue on a yield-to-maturity basis, instead of ratably.177  Holders would have to 
include the OID in income, under the OID accrual rules.
One commentator took the view that this change in the reorganization Issue 
Price rule was "an apparent attempt to ensure that [the new bond's Issue Price] 
would be measured in accordance with National Alfalfa principles."178  However, it 
is not clear from the legislative history whether Congress had the principles of 
National Alfalfa in mind at all, or whether Congress was simply trying to find a way 
to end the perceived abuse associated with the popular pre-1982 deferred debt 
transactions described above.
609.
175
 1982 Act § 306(a)(9)(C).  The 1982 Act changes applied to debt issued after December 
13, 1982.
176
 Consider how the change in 1982 affected the tax consequences of the example in note 
173 supra.  Under the 1982 Act, the Issue Price of the new note would be $1,000, so the 
holder would include $200 of OID and the issuer would deduct $200 of OID over the life of 
the instrument.176  The issuer would not realize any bond retirement premium on the 
exchange because the $1,000 Issue Price of the new debt equals the $1,000 Adjusted Issue 
Price of the old debt.
The repeal of the special reorganization Issue Price rule, and the enactment of § 
1232(b)(4), created difficult interpretive problems that commentators quickly noted.  See, 
e.g., Canellos & Kleinbard, supra note 102 at 613-17, noting the following problems: (1) 
creation of OID under the rule where it would not exist as an economic matter; (2) distortion 
of COD income; and (3) difficulty in applying the rule to a package of consideration.  These 
interpretation problems continued when § 1232(b)(4) was later redesignated § 1275(a)(4).
177 H.R. REP. NO. 986, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1982).  For a thorough discussion of the 
legislative history of this provision, see Canellos & Kleinbard, supra note 102, at 609-12.
178
 Emanuel S. Burstein, Federal Income Taxation of Debt Swaps and Modifications , 17 J. 
CORP. TAX'N. 3, n.92 (1990).
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Congress changed the Issue Price rules again in 1984.  Section 42 of the 
1984 Act179 repealed §§ 1232 and 1232A, and added new §§ 1271 to 1275 to deal 
with OID.  Section 1273(b)(1) through (4) and § 1274 set forth various rules for 
determining the Issue Price of debt instruments generally.  However, where debt was 
issued in exchange for debt in a reorganization, § 1275(a)(4)180 provided that the 
Issue Price of the new debt was the greater of (1) the Issue Price determined under 
§§ 1273(b) and 1274, or (2) the Adjusted Issue Price of the old debt. 
Section 1273(b)(3) applies if (1) debt is issued for property, including the 
outstanding stock or debt of the issuer, and, (2) either the debt or the property 
received by the issuer in the exchange is traded on an established securities market.  
The Issue Price of such debt is the fair market value of the property received in 
exchange for the debt.181
179 The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494.
180
 I.R.C. § 1275(a)(4) was the successor to the carryover Issue Price rule of § 1232(b)(4), 
which applied in reorganizations.  Section 41(a) of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 
modified § 1232(b)(4) and redesignated it as § 1275(a)(4).  Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494.
181
 I.R.C. § 1273(b)(3) (2000).  The various Issue Price rules of §§ 1273(b) and 1274 
distinguish between (1) instruments that are publicly traded and those that are not, and (2) 
instruments that are issued for money and instruments that are issued for "property."  
“Property” does not include money.  I.R.C. § 1273(b)(5) (2000).  Section 1273(b)(1) 
applies to debt instruments that are publicly offered and are issued for money.  Debt is 
"publicly offered" if it is registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission, would 
be required to be registered but for the identity of the issuer, or is exempt from 
registration under section 3 of the Securities Act of 1933.  Treas. Reg. section 1.1273-
2(a)(2).  The Issue Price of such debt is the initial offering price to the public at which 
price a substantial amount of such debt instruments was sold.  I.R.C. § 1273(b)(1) (2000).  
Section 1273(b)(2), which applies to debt that is not publicly offered and which is issued 
for money, provides that that the Issue Price of such debt is the price paid for the debt by 
the first buyer of the debt.  I.R.C. § 1273(b)(2) (2000).
Section 1273(b)(4) applies if nonpublicly traded debt is issued in exchange for 
nonpublicly traded property, including the stock or debt of the issuer, and § 1274 does 
not apply to the exchange.  If § 1274 applies to the exchange, § 1274 will determine the 
Issue Price of the debt issued in the exchange.  If § 1273(b)(4) applies, the Issue Price of 
the debt is deemed to be the stated redemption price at maturity of the debt.  Section 
1274(c)(1) provides that § 1274 applies to any debt instrument issued for property if the 
stated redemption price at maturity of the debt instrument exceeds (1) the "stated 
principal amount" of the debt, where there is "adequate stated interest" on the debt, or (2) 
the "imputed principal amount" where the debt does not bear "adequate stated interest."  
The debt has "adequate stated interest" if the stated interest rate on the debt instrument 
exceeds the applicable federal rate (published monthly by the Service), or if the "stated 
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As mentioned above, the special reorganization rule of § 1275(a)(4) 
provided that, if debt was exchanged for debt in a reorganization, and the Adjusted 
Issue Price of the old debt was greater that the Issue Price of the new debt, as 
determined under §§ 1273(b), then the Issue Price of the new debt was the Adjusted 
Issue Price of the old debt.  In effect, § 1275(a)(4) precluded a debtor corporation 
from converting market discount (the decline in the value of the debt since 
issuance), which is not deductible, into deductible OID, by exchanging new debt 
for the old debt.
The § 1275(a)(4) issue price rule was also thought to preclude the creation 
of COD income in a debt-for-debt exchange. Before 1990, it was often assumed 
that the OID issue price of the new debt (which, for OID purposes, is the amount 
borrowed) should be treated as the amount paid to discharge the old debt, 
although the link between the OID and COD income rules was not explicit in the 
Code.182 If, in a debt-for-debt exchange, § 1275(a)(4) applied to determine the 
amount for which the old debt had been discharged, the Issue Price of the new 
debt could not be less than the Adjusted Issue Price of the old debt, so there could 
never be COD income in a debt-for-debt exchange.
Section 1275(a)(4) raised a number of difficult interpretation issues.  For 
purposes of § 1275, § 1275(a)(4)(B)(ii) provided that "Adjusted Issue Price" was the 
Issue Price of the debt plus the previously included OID on the debt.  This definition, 
which failed to take into account unamortized bond issuance premium, could cause 
distortions where the old debt had bond issuance premium.183  Section 1275(a)(4) 
could also cause distortions where the stated redemption price at maturity of the new 
debt differed from the stated redemption price at maturity of the old debt.184
principal amount" (the sum of all payments due under the instrument, less payments 
designated as interest) is less than or equal to the "imputed principal amount" (the sum of 
the discounted present values of all payments due under the instrument, discounted at the 
applicable federal rate).  Treas. Reg. § 1.1274-3(a) and (b).  If § 1274 applies and the debt 
has adequate stated interest, the Issue Price of the debt is the "stated principal amount" of 
the debt.  If § 1274 applies and the debt does not bear adequate stated interest, the Issue 
Price is the imputed principal amount.
182
 The link between the OID and COD rules was clear with respect to debt that was 
issued in exchange for cash and retired for cash. See, e.g., Reg. 65 Art. 545(c) under the 
1924 Act: “If, however, the corporation purchases and retires any of such bonds at a price 
less than the issuing price plus any amount of discount already deducted, the excess of the 
issuing price plus any amount of discount already deducted . . . over the purchase price is 
gain or income for the taxable year.”  It was unclear, however, how this rule applied to debt 
that was issued in exchange for property, or to debt that was retired in exchange for property.
183
 Hariton, supra note 169, at 885. 
184 Id.
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Another problem with § 1275(a)(4) was that its application was unclear where a
package of new debt plus cash, or an investment unit, was exchanged for the old 
debt.185
The government became concerned that the various plausible approaches 
for applying § 1275(a)(4) permitted taxpayers to “cherry pick” results.186 Instead of 
resolving the various interpretation questions regarding § 1275(a)(4), Treasury 
instead rejected the entire substitution of liabilities approach (also known as the 
"carryover issue price model") of § 1275(a)(4), in favor of a hypothetical cash 
issuance approach.187  Under this new approach, a debt-for-debt exchange would 
be treated like any other issuance of new debt in exchange for property and the 
general OID issue price rules would determine the issue price of the debt issued in 
a debt-for-debt exchange.188
185
 Wilcox, supra note 139, at 403-04.  The OID rules in the Code and regulations 
provide specific operating rules to deal with debt instruments with certain features.  
Section 1273(c) and regulation section 1.1273-2(d)(1) provide special operating rules for 
determining the section 1273(b) Issue Price of debt issued in an "investment unit" with an 
option, stock or other property.  Section 1273(c) requires that the Issue Price for the 
investment unit be allocated between the debt and other property based on relative fair 
market value of the two pieces.  The regulation says that if the debt is publicly traded, the 
Issue Price of the debt is the initial trading price of the debt instrument.  If the property 
right is publicly traded and the debt is not publicly traded, the Issue Price of the debt 
instrument is the price paid for the investment unit less the initial trading price of the debt 
instrument.  If neither piece is traded, the Issue Price is the present value of the payments 
due under the instrument, discounted at a rate agreed to by the issuer and the holder, and 
based on comparable debt instruments, but such rate cannot be less than the applicable 
federal rate.  Where an investment unit was issued in exchange for old debt and section 
1275(a)(4) applied to determine the Issue Price of the new debt (because the Adjusted 
Issue Price of the old debt exceeds the section 1273 or 1274 Issue Price), it was not clear 
how section 1275(a)(4) allocated the Adjusted Issue Price of the old debt to the new debt.
186 See H.R. REP. NO. 881, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 353, 354 (1990); Sen. Fin. Comm., 
101st Cong., 2d Sess., Explanation of Revenue Reconciliation Bill of 1990, 136 CONG. 
REC. S15667, S15708 (daily ed., Oct. 18, 1990).  For a detailed account of the repeal of 
I.R.C. § 1275(a)(4), see Benjamin Cohen & Gary Henningsen, Jr., The Repeal of Section 
§ 1275(a)(4), 44 Tax Law.  697, 720-22 (1990).
187 Jayne Levin, IRS Studies Tax Change Aimed at Exchange Offers: Fair Market 
Valuation is Key, INVESTMENT DEALER'S DIGEST, May 14, 1990.
188 James Eichen et al., Reasons for Reenacting Code Section 1275(a)(4): Analysis and 
Recommendations on H.R. 5655, 55 TAX NOTES 1461 (1992).
KATHERINE PRATT
36
In 1990, Congress repealed § 1275(a)(4).189  The provision repealing § 
1275(a)(4) was added to the bill late in the legislative process.190  The tax and 
bankruptcy bar quickly mobilized to try to prevent the repeal of § 1275(a)(4),191 but 
the repeal provision was included in the bill and became law.  Following the repeal, 
commentators argued, unsuccessfully, for reinstatement of § 1275(a)(4).192
Congress, in 1990, also enacted new § 108(e)(11),193 which provided that, 
for purposes of determining COD income in a debt-for-debt exchange, the debtor 
corporation would be treated as though it had discharged the old debt for “an amount 
of money equal to the issue price” of the new debt.  Where the old or new debt is 
publicly traded, this means that the new debt has an Issue Price equal to the fair 
market value of the debt.  Said another way, this section adopted the hypothetical 
cash issuance model for calculating COD income.  It also explicitly linked the OID 
and COD income rules in debt-for-debt exchanges.
In addition, the Cottage Savings case,194 decided in 1991, and subsequent 
treasury regulations195 impose a “hair trigger” for realization in debt 
modifications.  Under these rules, many modifications of outstanding debt are 
treated as debt-for-debt exchanges. 196
2. The narrowing and repeal of the stock-for-debt exception to COD
income.
Congress also gradually narrowed and eventually repealed the stock-for-debt 
exception to COD income. In 1970, Congress created a special commission to 
consider the reform of U.S bankruptcy law.197 The commission’s report included 
recommendations about reform of the Internal Revenue Code. For several years,
members of Congress, Treasury Department and Justice Department officials, 
representatives of the Service, and lawyers and accountants from private practice
189
 Section 11325(a)(2) of the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1990. Pub. L. No. 101-508, 
104 Stat. 1388 (1990).
190 Cohen & Henningsen, supra note 186, at 720.
191 Id. at 720 and n.127.
192 See, e.g., id. at 734 (the repeal of § 1275(a)(4) “imposes tax liability based on what 
will be regarded as a subtle and theoretical, if not wholly artificial, view of the 
transaction”).
193 Id., § 11325(a)(1).  Today, this provision is in I.R.C. § 108(e)(10) (2000).
194
 Cottage Savings Assoc. v. Commissioner, 499 U.S. 554 (1991).
195
 Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-3.
196 Id.
197
 This summary of the passage of the Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980 is based on the 
detailed discussion in Asofsky, supra note 76, at 13-1 to 13-11. 
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debated these proposals.  The debates culminated in the passage of the 
Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980.198
During the debate of the proposed legislation, government and private 
witnesses strongly disagreed about two specific issues, one of which was the 
stock-for-debt-exception to COD income. 199  In particular, the parties disagreed 
about whether a stock-for-debt exchange should result in reduction of the debtor 
corporation’s tax attributes.200  Tax lawyers from the Treasury Department and 
Justice Department testified that stock-for-debt exchanges should result in 
attribute reduction, notwithstanding Motor Mart Trust, but private practice 
lawyers and accountants argued against that change in the law.201 The House 
version of the bill would have retained the stock-for-debt exception in tax-free 
reorganizations and precluded attribute reduction in such cases. Stock-for-debt 
exchanges that did not qualify as tax-free reorganizations, on the other hand, 
would have resulted in COD income and attribute reduction.  The Senate 
eliminated these provisions from the bill, and the Senate Report specified that the 
bill would not alter the case law on COD income and attribute reduction in stock-
for-debt exchanges.202 The Senate version of the bill became the Bankruptcy Tax 
Act of 1980.203
The Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980 included two specific limitations on the 
stock-for-debt exception, in order to curb perceived abuses of the exception.204
First, the stock-for-debt exception did not apply to the issuance of "nominal or 
token shares."205  Second, the stock-for-debt exception did not apply where the 
198
 Pub. L. No. 96-589, 94 Stat. 3389, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
199
 Asofsky, supra note 76, at 13-8 and 13-9.
200 Id. at 13-9.
201 Id. at 13-10. (The Justice and Treasury Department witnesses included Carr Ferguson, 
Daniel Halperin, and David Shakow, all of whom became law professors.)
202 S. REP. NO. 1035, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1980):
The committee bill generally does not change the present law 
rule developed by the courts governing whether income is 
recognized if a corporation issues its own stock to its creditor for 
outstanding debt (whether or not the debt constitutes a security 
for tax purposes).  Therefore, no attribute reduction generally 
will be required where such stock is issued to discharge the debt. 
Id.
203
 Asofsky, supra note 76,  at 13-11.
204
 Pub. L. No. 96-589, 94 Stat. 3389, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) (hereinafter the 
Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980). 
205
 Section 108(e)(8)(A) (repealed).  This limitation was known as the "de minimis" 
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ratio of the value of the stock received by an unsecured creditor to the value of the 
indebtedness canceled or exchanged for the stock was less than 50% of a similar 
ratio computed for all unsecured creditors.206
In the early 1980s, "debt-equity swaps" became popular.  Interest rates 
rose significantly at that time, which caused the value of outstanding corporate 
debt to decline.  Corporate debtors could not retire outstanding debt at a discount 
for cash without triggering COD income.  If the debtor retired the debt for stock 
instead of cash, on the other hand, the exchange qualified for the stock-for-debt
exception to COD income and did not result in COD income or attribute 
reduction.207  In 1984, Congress limited use of the stock-for-debt exception to 
financially troubled debtors.208  Section 108(e)(10) provided that a debtor 
corporation could only qualify for the stock-for-debt exception (1) to the extent of 
its insolvency, or (2) if the debtor had filed a bankruptcy petition.209
In 1990, Congress amended § 108 to provide that the stock-for-debt
exception would not apply to the issuance of callable or putable preferred stock, 
which Congress considered to be economically similar to debt.210  Treasury also 
issued controversial regulations under § 108(e)(8) that made it even more difficult 
for debtors to rely on the stock-for-debt exception.211
limitation.
206
 Section 108(e)(8)(B) (repealed).  This limitation, known as the "proportionality 
limitation," could create problems in the restructuring of troubled companies with 
subordinated debt, because junior creditors often received a substantially lower 
percentage recovery than senior creditors.
207
 For a description of the debt-equity swap fad and the enactment of § 108(e)(10), see 
Bryan, supra note 46,  at 89.
208
 The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat.) 
494 [hereinafter the 1984 Act].
209
 This is the same test used to determine qualification for the § 108(a) COD exclusion. 
This test creates an incentive for debtors to file a bankruptcy petition, since there is often 
uncertainty about the degree of the debtor’s insolvency. Katherine Pratt, Shifting Biases: 
Troubled Company Debt Restructurings After the 1993 Tax Act, 68 AM. BANKR. L.J. 23, 
n.31 (1994) [hereinafter, Pratt, Shifting Biases].
210
 Omnibus Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1990 § 11325(a), Pub. L. No. 101-508, 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. (104 Stat.) 1388.  On noted earlier, the 1990 Act also repealed § 1275(a)(4) 
with respect to debt-for-debt exchanges.
211
 Prop. Treas. Reg. §  1.108-1, 55 Fed. Reg. 50568 (1990).  The safe harbor standards in 
the 1990 proposed regulations were so onerous that commentators accused Treasury of 
converting the statutory de minimis requirement into a regulatory "de maximis" 
requirement.  See Lee Sheppard, IRS Gets Educated at Hearing on Stock-for-debt 
Exception, 50 TAX NOTES 1204 (1991).  The 1990 proposed regulations were 
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In 1992, a provision repealing the stock-for-debt exception was included 
in a bill that passed but was vetoed by President Bush.212 The next year, the 
repeal became law,213 over the strenuous objection of the bankruptcy tax bar.214
The repeal of § 1275(a)(4) and the stock-for-debt exception changed the 
tax incentives in bankruptcy workouts and restructurings. Under the old 
substitution of liabilities approach to debt-for-debt and stock-for-debt exchanges, 
a debtor corporation could do a debt-for-debt or stock-for-debt exchange offer in 
an out of court workout without triggering COD income.  Under the hypothetical 
cash issuance model, such exchanges trigger COD income.  Debtor corporations 
are wary of relying on the insolvency exclusion for COD income, so the 
hypothetical cash issuance model increases the incentive in favor of filing a 
bankruptcy petition in order to qualify for the blanket COD income exclusion.215
In addition, the adoption of the hypothetical cash issuance model has 
increased the incentive to issue debt instead of stock in bankruptcy restructurings. 
The exclusion of COD income, under § 108(a), results in the reduction of tax 
withdrawn in November 1992 and Treasury subsequently issued more permissive 
regulations under § 108(e)(8).  57 Fed. Reg. 52601 (1992).
212
 42 H.R. 5674, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. §  203 (1992) (incorporated into H.R. 11, 102d 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
213
 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 13226 (a)(1), 107 
Stat. 312, 487 (1993).
214 See, e.g., letter from Peter Canellos, of the New York State Bar Association Tax 
Section, to Senate Finance Committee Chair Daniel Moynihan (June 23, 1993), reprinted 
in TAX NOTES TODAY (June 29, 1993) (expressing concern about the repeal).
215
 Insolvency is the excess of the debtor’s liabilities over the value of the debtor's assets. 
§  108(d)(3). There are a number of open questions about how this formula is to be 
applied.  For example, there is uncertainty about how the debtor's liabilities are to be 
measured and how the debtor's assets are to be valued. See, e.g., Fred Witt & William 
Lyons, An Examination of the Tax Consequences of Discharge of Indebtedness, 10 VA. 
TAX REV. 1, 56-57 (1990) (arguing that contingent liabilities should not be taken into 
account for purposes of determining insolvency). In addition, the insolvency test requires 
valuation of all of the debtor's assets, which is both difficult and fraught with uncertainty.  
Chaim Fortgang & Thomas Mayer, Valuations in Bankruptcy, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1061 
(1985). A debtor relying on the insolvency exclusion runs the risk that the Internal 
Revenue Service ("IRS") will later challenge the valuation that was the basis for 
concluding that the exclusion applied to the debt discharge. An insolvent debtor can 
avoid having to establish its degree of insolvency by filing a bankruptcy petition and 
qualifying for the blanket exclusion of I.R.C. § 108(a)(1)(A) (2000).
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attributes, including net operating losses.216  On the other hand, the issuance of 
new discount debt in a bankruptcy restructuring can create new OID deductions 
under the hypothetical cash issuance model.217  New OID debt issued in a 
restructuring can shelter post-restructuring income in a manner similar to net 
operating losses.  Where the restructuring creates COD income that reduces the 
debtor corporation’s net operating losses, the debtor corporation has a tax
incentive to issue new discount debt in the restructuring in order to shelter post 
restructuring income.218
We have replaced the substitution of liabilities or subscription price 
approach to debt-for-debt exchanges and stock-for-debt exchanges with a 
hypothetical cash issuance approach to such exchanges. We have done so, in part, 
based on certain theoretical tax principles.
Consider the normative justifications for our current approach to COD 
income in debt-for-debt and stock-for-debt exchanges.  First, the hypothetical 
cash issuance approach has been justified by the comprehensive tax base 
principle.  Said another way, the goal is accurate measurement of income.219
Income is determined annually, not on a transactional basis.220 The idea is that, 
where a debtor corporation discharges debt, which has declined in value, by 
exchanging it for new debt or stock, the corporation has income in an amount 
equal to the amount owed on the discharged debt less the value of the new debt or 
stock.221 What has happened in previous years is irrelevant, and what will happen 
in future years is irrelevant.222 We view the OID rules as correctly reflecting the 
annual determination of accrued interest on debt, so we use the OID rules to 
determine the amount of the old debt discharged and, in a debt-for-debt exchange, 
the hypothetical amount paid to discharge the old debt.223  The OID rules adopt a 
216
 I.R.C. § 108(b).
217
 These interest deductions may, however, be limited by I.R.C. § 163(e)(5) (2000).
218
 Miller, supra note 1, at 21.
219 See, e.g., Cohen & Henningsen, supra note 186, at 732 (“one of the stated reasons for 
the repeal of section 1275(a)(4) was to ensure the proper measurement of income from 
discharge of indebtedness.”).
220
 I.R.C. § 441; Burnet v. Sanford and Brooks, 282 U.S. 359 (1931); Vukasovich, Inc. v. 
Commissioner, 790 F.2d 1409 (9th Cir. 1986) (the decision in Burnet v. Sanford & 
Brooks precludes application of the transactional accounting approach used in the earlier 
Kerbaugh-Empire case).
221
 Kies, supra note 157, at 1624 (1992).
222
 The hypothetical cash issuance approach replaced the earlier substitution of liabilities 
or subscription price approach to debt-for-debt and stock-for-debt exchanges.
223 H.R. REP. NO. 881, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 353, 354 (1990); Sen. Fin. Comm., 101st 
Cong., 2d Sess., Explanation of Revenue Reconciliation Bill of 1990, 136 CONG. REC. 
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hypothetical cash issuance approach to the issuance of debt in exchange for 
property.224
Second, the hypothetical cash issuance approach has been justified by the 
principle of horizontal equity, which is invoked in two ways.  First, the horizontal 
equity principle is invoked to support arguments that economically comparable 
transactions should be treated the same.225  This argument is an argument in favor 
of consistency: if the discharge of corporate debt for cash creates COD income, 
the discharge of corporate debt for debt or stock of comparable value should also 
create COD income.  Second, the horizontal equity principle is cited to support 
the argument that the hypothetical cash issuance approach should be applied to all 
debtor corporations, regardless of whether the debtor corporation is financially 
troubled; if thriving corporations have COD income from a stock-for-debt or 
debt-for-debt exchange, troubled corporations should also have COD income 
from a stock-for-debt or debt-for-debt exchange.226
These principles do not provide a compelling justification for the current 
treatment of stock-for-debt exchanges and debt-for-debt exchanges. The next Part 
critiques the theoretical justifications for the current COD income rules applicable 
in debt-for-debt and stock-for-debt exchanges.
IV. A NORMATIVE EVALUATION OF OUR APPROACH TO COD INCOME IN DEBT-
FOR-DEBT AND STOCK-FOR-DEBT EXCHANGES.
This Part evaluates the current tax treatment of corporate debt discharge in 
debt-for-debt and stock-for-debt exchanges under two alternative normative 
approaches.  The first approach is a comprehensive tax base or horizontal equity 
approach.  Under this approach, we apply a general theory of COD income to 
determine the proper tax treatment of corporate debt discharge in debt-for-debt 
and stock-for-debt exchanges.  The alternative normative approach is to determine 
the proper tax treatment of such transactions by applying principles of economic 
efficiency.
A. The comprehensive tax base or horizontal equity approach.  
S15667, S15708 (daily ed., Oct. 18, 1990).
224
 Kies, supra note 157, at 1624.
225 H.R. REP. No. 881, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 353, 354 (1990); Sen. Fin. Comm., 101st
Cong., 2d Sess., Explanation of Revenue Reconciliation Bill of 1990, 136 CONG. REC. 
S15667, S15708 (daily ed., Oct. 18, 1990).
226
 Kies, supra note 157, at 1623-24.
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Tax commentators have consistently applied a comprehensive tax base or 
horizontal equity norm to determine the appropriate tax treatment of COD 
income.  They have stressed the desirability of applying the same debt discharge 
approach to all taxpayers, regardless of the type of transaction in which the debt is 
discharged (i.e., whether the outstanding debt is discharged in exchange for cash, 
new debt, or new stock), and regardless of the taxpayer’s financial circumstances 
(i.e., solvent or insolvent).  Said another way, proponents of this approach have 
tried to provide a consistent, comprehensive COD income rule for debt 
discharge.227
The COD income consequences of debt-for-debt and stock-for-debt 
exchanges depend on which general COD theory we apply to these exchanges.  If 
we applied the Kerbaugh-Empire “whole transaction” approach to COD income, 
we would have to trace the loan proceeds to determine whether the loan 
transaction as a whole produced a gain or loss.  As commentators and courts have 
observed, however, this particular approach is surely no longer good law.228
If we applied the Kirby Lumber “freeing of assets” approach, the 
consequences of the debt discharge would depend on the circumstances in the 
year of the debt discharge, in particular, the solvency or insolvency of the debtor 
corporation.  (Circumstances in the year in which the debt was incurred would be 
irrelevant.)  Under this approach, the exchange would create COD income if it 
increased the shareholders’ balance sheet net worth, regardless of the manner in 
which the debt is discharged (i.e., for cash, new debt or stock).  Debt discharge 
would not produce COD income, however, if the discharge did not make the
corporation solvent.  Although tax commentators have consistently rejected this 
approach, as “outmoded,”229 the freeing of assets language in the Kirby Lumber
opinion continues to create tension between the freeing of assets theory and other 
COD income theories.230
227 See, e.g., Bittker & Thompson, supra note 17 (articulating the “loan proceeds” or 
“symmetry” theory of COD income).
228 See, e.g., Dodge, supra note 61 , at 678 and text at n.8; Seto, supra note 28, at 211; 
Schenk, supra note 61, at 106 (noting that it is often not possible to trace the use of the 
loan proceeds).  See also Vukasovich, Inc. v. Commissioner, 790 F.2d 1409 (9th Cir. 
1986) (holding that Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks precluded application of the earlier 
transactional approach in Kerbaugh-Empire.)  
229 See, e.g., Geier, supra note 64, at 144 (describing the freeing of assets theory as 
"outmoded").
230 See, e.g., United States v. Centennial Savings Bank, 499 U.S. 573, 583 (1991) (in 
which the Supreme Court seems to be applying both the freeing of assets approach and 
the loan proceeds approach).
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If we applied the simpler form of the Bittker and Thompson loan proceeds 
approach, we would require the corporation to include in income any untaxed 
loan proceeds that will not be repaid.  This rule is simply a timing rule that 
requires the corporation to include, in the year of the discharge, the previously 
untaxed loan proceeds that will not be repaid.  This approach focuses exclusively 
on the exclusion of the loan proceeds in the year in which the debt was incurred. 
Other circumstances in the year in which the debt was incurred are irrelevant.
Applying the stronger form of the Bittker and Thompson loan proceeds 
theory, however, other circumstances in the year in which the loan was made
could affect the amount of the COD income inclusion.  Under this approach, we 
would look back to the year in which the debt was incurred and ask whether the 
debtor would have been able to exclude the loan proceeds in the year in which the 
debt was incurred if we had known at the time what was going to happen in the 
later year of the discharge.  
If, in the later year, the debt is exchanged for new debt, with a face amount 
at least equal to the face amount of the debt discharged, it may be that nothing has 
happened that is inconsistent with the earlier exclusion. In such a case, there truly 
has been a substitution of liabilities.  If, on the other hand, the new debt has a face 
amount that is less than the face amount of the old debt, we know that the 
difference between the face of the old debt and the face of the new debt will never 
be repaid, which could, under this theory, support the creation of COD income in 
an amount equal to the difference between the old and new face amount.  This is 
the rule that we had in place for debt-for-debt exchanges until we abandoned the 
substitution of liabilities approach in favor of the hypothetical cash issuance 
model.231
The stronger form of the loans proceeds approach could also justify the 
stock-for-debt exception.  If, in the year in which the loan was incurred, we had 
known that the loan would be converted into stock in a later year, that information 
does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the loan proceeds would have 
been included in income.  The “error” in such a case would have been the 
characterization of the loan as debt; if, in the year of the borrowing, we had 
characterized the loan proceeds as a capital contribution, the corporate taxpayer 
could have excluded the proceeds nonetheless.232
231 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 77-437, 1977-2 C.B. 28.
232
 I.R.C. § 1032.  A corporate taxpayer is also not taxed on the discharge of stock for less 
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Courts applying the stock-for-debt exception to COD income often spoke 
in terms of a substitution of liabilities.233  The problem with this approach is that 
tax commentators have stressed time and again that the taxpayer’s choice of form 
matters, for purposes of the corporate tax.234  The corporate tax permits 
corporation to deduct interest on debt but does not permit corporations to deduct 
dividends on stock, so debt and equity are not equivalent sources of capital for 
purposes of the corporate tax.235
The subscription price theory is a stronger rationale for the stock-for-debt 
exception to COD income.236  Commentators have dismissed the subscription 
price theory on the grounds that the creditor did not buy stock, but instead made a 
loan.237  This is no doubt true in the year of the loan, but the question is what type 
of error correction is required when, in a later year, a creditor exchanges that debt 
for stock. 
Tax commentators who favor applying a hypothetical cash issuance model 
to a stock-for-debt exchange are implicitly arguing that the fictional corporate 
taxpayer must pay the price for converting debt into equity.  They are saying that 
there is income when the debtor corporation “closes out” the loan transaction and 
converts debt into stock.  On the other hand, the problem is not so much that the 
than the amount received on the issuance of the stock.  I.R.C. § 311.
233 See, e.g., Capento Sec. Corp. v. Commissioner, 47 B.T.A. 691, 695, aff'd, 140 F.2d 
382 (1st Cir. 1942).
234 See, e.g., Rockler, supra note 105, at 137-38.
235
 I.R.C. § 163(a) (2000).
236
 I.R.C. § 118 provides that contributions to the capital of a corporation are not income 
to the corporation.  Until recently, cancellation of corporate debt held by shareholders 
was treated entirely as a contribution to capital, not as COD.  Treas. Reg. § 1.61-12(a) 
(debt cancellation by a shareholder is treated as a § 118 contribution to capital); Putoma 
Corp. v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 652, aff’d 601 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1979) (section 118 
trumps COD rules).  Section 108(e)(6) now overrides § 118 and provides that debt 
cancellation by a shareholder is treated as though the shareholder discharged the debt for 
an amount of money equal to the shareholder’s basis in the debt.  This rule does not 
typically create COD because the shareholder’s basis usually equals the amount owed on 
the debt.  For examples of situations in which the shareholder’s basis would not equal the 
amount owed on the debt, see Schenk, supra note 61, at 120, n.74, and DAVID C. 
GARLOCK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF DEBT INSTRUMENTS 15-84.41, n.254 (4th 
ed. 2000, with 2003 Supp.).
237 See, e.g., Kies, supra note 157, at 1622 (“most creditors would indeed be surprised to 
learn that money they have advanced to a corporation in a nonconvertible loan 
transaction was a ‘prepaid subscription price for stock to be issued at an undetermined 
time in the future.’”) (citation omitted).
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loan proceeds were excluded in the year in which the debt is incurred; the real 
problem is that the corporate taxpayer took interest deductions on the debt while 
the debt was outstanding.  
Professor Seto has criticized even the stronger form of the loan proceeds 
approach precisely because it fails to take into account events that occurred while 
the loan was outstanding.  If we applied a broader transactional approach, looking 
at the years during which the loan was outstanding, not just at the year of the 
borrowing and the year of the discharge,238 we could permit a corporation to 
convert debt into stock without COD income on the debt discharge, but require 
recapture of all or a part of the interest deductions taken on the debt converted 
into stock.239
Consider a thought experiment.  How would we tax the discharge of 
corporate debt for less than the amount owed if we did not allow a corporation to 
deduct interest, or if we allowed corporations to deduct only a cost of capital 
allowance, without regard to capital structure?  Under current law, a corporation’s 
retirement of stock for less than the subscription price of the stock does not create 
income,240 but the discharge of debt for less than the amount owed creates COD 
income.241  If we equated the tax treatment of interest and dividends, but left in 
place other distinctions between debt and equity (such as the distinction between 
accrual taxation and realization taxation), would we still distinguish between the 
equity approach, of § 1032 and § 311, and the COD income approach of § 
61(a)(12)? 
Disallowing the corporate interest deduction or adopting a cost of capital 
allowance system is consistent with the notion that all public security holders, not 
just shareholders, are the “owners” of the corporation.242 Under this approach, the 
238
 This transactional approach would not require the impractical sort of tracing of loan 
proceeds that the Kerbaugh-Empire “whole transaction” approach requires.
239
 There are many other differences between the tax treatment of debt and equity, but the 
difference between the treatment of interest and dividends is arguably the most important.
240
 I.R.C. § 311 (2000).
241
 I.R.C. § 61(a)(12) (2000).
242
 Edwin Seligman argued in 1909 that corporate income is the earnings on the 
combined debt and equity capital invested in the corporation.  (Consistent with this view, 
he argued that corporations should not be allowed an interest deduction.)  Alvin C. 
Warren, Jr., The Corporate Interest Deduction: A Policy Evaluation, 83 YALE L. J. 1585, 
1597 (1974) (quoting EDWIN R.A. SELIGMAN, ESSAYS IN TAXATION 246 (9th ed. 1921)).  
Congress rejected Seligman’s proposal, in keeping with the traditional theory of the firm, 
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retirement of corporate debt and equity at a discount arguably should be treated 
the same way for tax purposes.  It would be consistent with this approach to 
completely repeal § 61(a)(12) for a corporation’s retirement of its own debt 
securities.243
The conceptual distinction between corporate debt and equity securities 
has always been questionable, but it is even more questionable today.244  This is, 
in part, because the corporate tax has been effectively converted into a tax on 
public companies and public company stock and debt securities are in many ways 
qualitatively similar.245  In addition, there has been a proliferation of hybrid 
securities that are difficult to classify.246  The cubbyhole approach to debt and 
equity, with its sharp discontinuity between the tax treatment of debt and equity, 
also creates opportunities for tax-motivated behavior.247
Professor Rudnick has argued that we should tax corporations on their 
“pure” profits on invested capital and let corporations deduct the “normal” profits 
on invested capital.248  This approach is consistent with permitting corporations to 
deduct a cost of capital allowance equal to the time value of money.249  Another 
possibility is a complete disallowance of interest deductions for corporate 
taxpayers.250  If we equated the corporate treatment of interest and dividends, 
which viewed the shareholders but not the bondholders as owners of the firm.  Katherine 
Pratt, The Debt-Equity Distinction in a Second-Best World, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1055, 
1067, (2000) [hereinafter Pratt, Debt-Equity Distinction].  In today’s environment, with 
the dispersion of corporate ownership and the conversion of the corporate tax into a tax 
on public companies, bondholders and shareholders are even more similar qualitatively.
243
 No legal commentators have suggested such a radical change in the tax law, but noted 
economist Merton Miller argued for the repeal of I.R.C. § 61(a)(12) in a 1991 corporate 
finance article.  Miller, supra note 1, at 22.  Miller’s proposal is discussed infra at Part 
IV.B.
244 See Pratt, Debt-Equity Distinction, supra note 243, at 1072-94.
245 Id. at 1075, 1113.
246 Id. at 1075-88.
247 See Strnad, supra note 26, at 571.
248
 Rebecca S. Rudnick, Who Should Pay the Corporate Tax in a Flat Tax World?, 39 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 965, 1172 (1988-89).  See also Pratt, Debt-Equity Distinction, 
supra note 243, at 1157.
249 See Edward D. Kleinbard, Beyond Good and Evil Debt (and Debt Hedges): A Cost of 
Capital Allowance System, 67 TAXES 943 (1989) for an argument in favor of adopting a 
cost of capital allowance proposal.  See also Pratt, Debt-Equity Distinction, supra note 
243, at 1139-45, 1156-57.
250 See, e.g., Herwig Schlunk, The Zen of Corporate Capital Structure Neutrality, 99 
MICH. L. REV. 410, 411 (2000) (arguing for the elimination of the corporate interest 
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perhaps we should also equate the treatment of corporate retirements of debt and 
equity.
Even if we do not equate the corporate treatment of interest and dividends, 
we still have to decide which of several competing defensible approaches to COD 
income is appropriate in debt-for-debt and stock-for-debt exchanges.  The goal of 
accurate measurement of income does not preclude the use of transactional 
accounting.251  In fact, in some circumstances, accurate measurement of income 
may require the use of transactional accounting.  As Professor Seto has noted in 
his article on complete accounting, the Code frequently permits the use of 
transactional accounting to facilitate more accurate measurement of income.252
For example, after the court held, in Burnet v. Sanford and Brooks,253 that income 
is determined on an annual, not a transactional basis, Congress amended the Code 
deduction).  See also, David A. Weisbach, Reconsidering the Accrual of Interest Income, 
78 TAXES 36, 47 (2000) [hereinafter Weisbach, Interest Accrual].  Professor Weisbach, 
in his assessment of the OID rules, observed that “any method of taxing interest that is 
indifferent to form is promising, or said more accurately, is like[ly] to have a low 
distortion per dollar of revenue.  Perhaps the most promising is to simply deny all interest 
deductions.”  Id.  Weisbach adds that we would increase revenue collection if we denied 
corporations an interest deduction and allowed bondholders to exclude interest income.  
This is because a great deal of interest income, which in theory is includible by 
bondholders, is functionally tax exempt because the bondholders are foreign or tax 
exempt entities.  Id. at 43-44.  Even if the bondholder is taxable, the bondholder can 
engage in tax trading to reduce the tax on the OID.  Id. at 44.  Said another way, clientele 
effects and tax trading reduce the amount of revenue collected on bondholders’ interest 
income.
251
 The default rule in our system is an annual accounting approach.  I.R.C. § 441 (2000).  
Courts have nonetheless consistently cited Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire in support of a 
transactional accounting approach to COD income.  Recall that the court in Kerbaugh-
Empire held that the consequences of the debt discharge depended on whether the 
transaction as a whole resulted in gain or loss.  This approach requires that a corporate 
debtor trace the loan proceeds to determine whether the entire transaction produced a 
gain or loss.  As many commentators have observed, surely this is no longer good law.  
See supra note 61.  On the other hand, that does not necessarily mean that there is no 
support for another form of transactional approach to debt discharge.  Kerbaugh-Empire
is, in a way, a “red herring” because of the idiosyncratic transactional approach the court 
used in that case.  Although Kerbaugh-Empire is no longer good law, another form of 
transactional approach to COD income may still be the better approach in stock-for-debt 
and debt-for-debt exchanges.
252
 Seto, supra note 28, at 225-27.
253 282 U.S. 359 (1931).
KATHERINE PRATT
48
to permit taxpayers to carry a net operating loss back and forward to offset 
income from other years.254  The default rule of annual accounting is justified by 
its administrative convenience; where transactional concepts are required to 
accurately reflect the taxpayer’s income, the transactional approach can trump the 
annual accounting approach.
We have rejected the substitution of liabilities model in favor of the 
hypothetical cash issuance model255 in part because the consensus is that the OID 
rules, which employ a hypothetical cash issuance model, correctly reflect 
economic reality.  Professor Weisbach has argued that we should not regard the 
OID rules as “right,” however, just because economic accrual of interest is 
typically closer to economic reality than ratable accrual of interest.256  In his view, 
the economic accrual of interest provided for in the OID rules is just one of 
several controversial approaches to the accrual of income.257
Professor Weisbach argues that developments in financial theory, such as 
the put-call parity theorem,258 call into question the risk-based distinction between 
accrual taxation and realization-based taxation.259  In addition, he argues that the 
OID rules do not necessarily reflect Haig-Simons income260 because the OID 
254
 I.R.C. § 172.
255
 Recall that, at one time, it was unclear whether a corporation could create OID by 
issuing new debt in exchange for stock or debt.  See supra part III.A.1. The current OID 
rules are clear that new debt issued in exchange for property, including debt or stock of 
the corporate issuer, can bear OID.  OID equals the stated redemption price of the debt 
less the Issue Price of the debt.  I.R.C. § 1273(a)(1) (2000).  The stated redemption price 
of the new debt is the amount payable at maturity plus certain stated interest.  I.R.C. § 
1273(a)(2) (2000).  The Issue Price of the new debt is determined under I.R.C. § 1273(b) 
(2000).  The Issue Price of the debt is its value or the value of the property for which it is 
traded (including the outstanding debt or stock of the issuer) if the debt or the property is 
publicly traded or the debt is issued for cash.  I.R.C. § 1273(b) (2000).
256
 Weisbach, Interest Accrual, supra note 250.
257 Id. at 39.
258
 For an explanation of the put-call parity theorem, see Pratt, Debt-Equity Distinction, 
supra note 243, at 1077-78.
259 Id. at 41. “Any distinction between fixed and contingent returns on assets is 
undermined by modern financial theory.” Id.
260 The Haig-Simons formula is one expression of a comprehensive income tax base.  
Under the Haig-Simons formula, income equals the sum of (1) the taxpayer's 
consumption during the period and (2) the taxpayer's change in wealth during the period. 
See Robert M. Haig, The Concept of Income--Economic and Legal Aspects, in THE 
FEDERAL INCOME TAX 7 (Robert M. Haig ed., 1921), reprinted in AM. ECON. ASS'N, 
READINGS IN THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION 54 (Richard A. Musgrave & Carl Shoup 
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rules do not take into account events that occur after issuance, such as interest rate 
fluctuations and changes in the creditworthiness of the corporate issuer.261  The 
OID rules are more likely to reflect reality than the ratable interest accrual rules 
they replaced,262 but clientele effects and tax trading may prevent the OID rules 
from collecting revenue consistent with this reality.263  The OID rules also include 
discontinuities that provide taxpayers with opportunities to engage in tax-
motivated transactions.264  They are also incredibly complex and may result in a 
loss of tax revenue.265
Professors Bankman and Klein have also argued that the ex ante method 
used to calculate OID deductions is inaccurate.266  The OID approach accrues 
interest at a constant yield-to-maturity.267  Bankman and Klein demonstrate that 
this ex ante approach to accruing interest does not take into account the term 
structure of interest.268  If short term interest rates and long term interest rates 
differ, using the constant-rate yield-to-maturity method mismeasures the annual 
interest accruals.  For example, if long-term rates are higher than short-term rates, 
the OID accrual method understates the accrual of interest on the front end of the 
eds., 1959); HENRY SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 50 (1938).  Expenditures 
incurred to produce income are not classified as consumption and are excluded from the 
base.  Personal expenditures, which are characterized as “consumption,” are included in 
the base.  See, e.g., Alvin C. Warren, Jr., The Corporate Interest Deduction: A Policy 
Evaluation, 83 YALE L.J. 1585,1591 (1974) (defining consumption as "the use of wealth 
for personal gratification" or "the destruction of economic resources") (citing George F. 
Break, Capital Maintenance and the Concept of Income, 62 J. POL. ECON. 48, 52 
(1954)).
261 Id. at 41.
262 See Canellos & Kleinbard, supra note 102, at 565.
263
 Weisbach, Interest Accrual, supra note 250, at 42-43.
264 Id. at 43.
265 Id.
266
 Joseph Bankman & William A. Klein, Accurate Taxation of Long-Term Debt: Taking 
Into Account the Term Structure of Interest, 44 TAX L. REV. 335 (1989).
267
 I.R.C. § 1272(a)(3) (OID for each period is computed by multiplying the Adjusted 
Issue Price of the debt by the yield-to-maturity of the debt).  Treas. Reg. § 1.1272-
1(b)(1)(i) provides that a debt instrument’s yield to maturity is “the discount rate that, 
when used in computing the present value of all principal and interest payments to be 
made under the debt instrument, produces an amount equal to the issue price of the debt 
instrument.”  The rate is a constant rate.  Id.
268
 Bankman & Klein, supra note 266, at 335.
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loan and overstates the accrual of interest on the back end of the loan.269  If short-
term rates are higher than long-term rates, the OID accrual method overstates the 
accrual of interest on the front end of the loan and understates the accrual of 
interest on the back end of the loan.270  The mismeasurement of the interest 
increases as the term of the loan increases and the differential between short and 
long term rates increases.271
Although the OID rules might seem, in theory, to more accurately measure 
income than the ratable allocation of interest method the OID rules replaced, 
Bankman and Klein argue that no ex ante method can, in all circumstances, 
measure interest accrual accurately.  Only an ex post system, such as a mark-to-
market system, can measure interest accrual accurately.272
Consider how corporate debt discharge would be treated in a mark-to-
market system.273  Corporate debt discharge at a discount increases the balance 
sheet net worth of the corporation’s shareholders, so it might seem at first that 
such a debt discharge would increase the value of the corporation’s outstanding 
stock and result in income.  The overall effect of the debt discharge, however, 
depends on the context within which the discharge occurs.  Consider the 
following example:274  Assume that Corporation Y, in an earlier year, issued $10x 
269 Id. at 338.
270 Id. at 341.
271 Id. at 339.
272 Id. at 348.
273 See e.g., Joseph M. Dodge, A Combined Mark-to-Market and Pass-Through 
Corporate-Shareholder Integration Proposal, 50 TAX L. REV. 265 (1995) (proposing a 
mark-to-market system to replace the corporate tax).  Note that, under a mark-to-market 
system, such as the system proposed by Professor Dodge, “[t]he distinction between debt 
and equity would disappear for stock subject to the mark-to-market regime, because 
neither dividends nor interest would be deductible. . . .”  Id.
274
 This example is loosely based on an example in Miller, supra note 1, at 22.  Miller’s 
example assumes that the bonds in the example are perpetuities, in order to simply the 
present value calculations. Miller uses this example to explain why he thinks that Kirby 
Lumber was wrongly decided:
The Internal Revenue Service . . . and the Supreme Court both seem to 
have been mesmerized in Kirby by the rise in book net worth that must 
occur under the conventions of double-entry bookkeeping whenever 
securities are retired at prices less than those at which they originally 
entered the company’s books.  Those gains must get to the net worth 
account somehow; otherwise the books won’t balance.  Unhappily, the 
only route to net worth the Bureau and the Court could seem to find at 
the time led through the income account.  Nowadays accountants just 
CORPORATE CANCELLATION OF INDEBTEDNESS INCOME 
51
of bonds bearing 5% interest.  Interest rates later increase to 10%.  The managers 
of Corporation Y decide to discharge the old bonds in exchange for $5x of new 
bonds bearing 10% interest.  Although the discharge of the old debt reduces the 
liabilities on the corporation’s balance sheet by $5x, the corporation’s annual 
interest obligation has not changed.275
The reduction in debt liabilities from $10x to $5x increases the 
shareholders’ balance sheet net worth by $5x, but that does not necessarily 
translate into an overall increase in the value of the stock because of the context 
within which the debt discharge occurs.  In the example, the old debt declines in 
value because interest rates have increased from 5% to 10%.  In other words, the 
corporation’s cost of capital has increased.  The increase in interest rates means 
that, other things being equal, the value of the stock declines as well, since the 
value of the stock is, in theory, the sum of the present values of the future cash 
flows of the corporation.  An increase in interest rates means that the discount rate 
used to compute those present values is higher and the stock is therefore worth 
less.276  This decline in the value of the stock from the interest rate increase 
offsets the increase in the value of the stock attributable to the debt discharge.  A 
mark-to-market system would take into account the multiple effects of the interest 
rate increase, not just the balance sheet increase in shareholder net worth that 
results from the debt discharge.
The conventional wisdom is that a substitution of liabilities approach is 
wrong and the hypothetical cash issuance approach is correct, but this argument 
boils down to an argument for a comprehensive, consistently applied theory of 
treat the net worth write-ups following debt retirements as “extraordinary 
items,” which is to say, they just post them to net worth directly.
Id. at 23.  Miller argues that the debt discharge in Kirby Lumber should have 
resulted in no income, just as a corporate repurchase of stock for less than the issue price 
of the stock results in no income.  In other words, he argues that the tax treatment of debt 
retirements should be the same as the tax treatment of stock repurchases.  Miller 
concluded that the court in Kirby Lumber “blew it because our corporate law then, as 
now, regards debt and equity as fundamentally distinct species (in contrast to modern 
finance theory, which treats them as basically equivalent sources of ‘capital’ for most, 
though certainly not all, purposes).”
275
 If the bonds have a fixed maturity, the annual interest payments the corporation owes 
could vary after the discharge of the old debt.  Id. at 23.
276
 For a discussion of valuation and the calculation of present value, see WILLIAM A. 
KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION & FINANCE: LEGAL AND 
ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 305-07 (2000).
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COD income.  We may, however, not want to apply a single COD income 
approach to all debt discharge transactions, regardless of the circumstances in 
which the debt is discharged.  We might, instead want to determine the tax 
consequences of various types of debt discharge by applying an economic 
efficiency norm.  
B. The economic efficiency approach.
When tax commentators argue that economically similar transactions 
should be taxed in a similar fashion, they are expressing the idea that our tax 
system should have the property of “consistency.”277  As Professor Strnad has 
observed, a tax system has the property of consistency only if the system provides 
a unique tax treatment for any possible cash flow pattern.278  Our corporate tax 
system includes a distinction between debt and equity, which creates a 
discontinuity.  Given this debt-equity distinction, how should we treat the 
exchange of new debt or stock for old debt?  Should it be subject to a substitution 
of liabilities/subscription price model or to a hypothetical cash issuance model?
And should the answer depend on the circumstances of the particular transaction?
Professor Weisbach argues that we should not resolve these sorts of 
questions by reference to the heuristics of the comprehensive tax base or 
horizontal equity.279  He argues that we should determine the tax treatment of the 
transaction in question by attempting to minimize efficiency losses280 keeping in 
mind the second-best setting in which the issue arises.281  For example, Weisbach 
277
 Strnad, supra note 26.  Professor Strnad has observed that a good tax system displays 
the properties of "universality," "consistency," "linearity" and "continuity."  Id. at 572, 
573 and 576.  A tax system has the property of universality only if the system specifies 
the particular treatment for any possible transaction.  Id. at  572.  A tax system has the 
property of consistency only if the system provides a unique tax treatment for any 
possible cash flow pattern.  Id. at 573.  A tax system has the property of linearity if "the 
tax on any transaction equals the sum of the taxes on any collection of subtransactions 
that comprise that transaction."  Id. at 576.  A tax system has the property of continuity if 
nearly identical portfolios have nearly identical tax consequences.  Id.
278 Id. at 573.  If a tax system has the property of consistency, "it is not possible to 
manipulate tax outcomes by repackaging cash flows into different financial vehicles."  In 
a second-best world, a tax proposal has to be considered in light of discontinuities that the 
policymaker cannot eliminate. Id. at 553.
279
 Weisbach, Interest Accrual, supra note 250, at 44.
280 Id. at 45.
281
 The theory of the second best posits that, in a world with multiple distortions, 
eliminating an economic distortion does not necessarily increase efficiency because of 
the effects of other remaining distortions.  Lipsey & Lancaster, supra note 25.
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advocates use of this approach to characterize hybrid securities as either debt or 
equity for tax purposes.282
Since the corporate tax creates known distortions and use of debt in a 
corporation’s capital structure operates as a form of do-it-yourself integration, we 
might at first think that debt-equity line drawing questions should favor debt 
classification.283  Weisbach cautions, however, that we must also consider the 
effects of the debt-equity classification on the costs of financial distress and 
related costs.284  Gergen and Schmitz, in their analysis of the classification of 
hybrid securities as debt or equity, consider the effects of the debt-equity 
distinction on capital structure decisions.285  In particular, they consider the 
tradeoff between the tax shield provided by debt and the increase in expected 
costs of financial distress that results from the use of debt in the capital 
structure.286
The current approach for determining COD income in debt-for-debt and 
stock-for-debt exchanges fails to take into account the economic effects of such 
rules on capital structure decisions.  In particular, the current approach fails to 
take into account the costs of financial distress when corporations choose to use
debt instead of equity in their financial structure.  This oversight is more 
problematic where the corporation exchanging new stock or debt for outstanding 
debt is financially troubled.
Numerous studies have estimated the costs of financial distress generally.  
The estimates in these studies vary greatly.  Some studies consider only the direct 
costs of bankruptcy, including legal and administrative fees and professional fees 
for lawyers, accountants and other professionals involved in the bankruptcy.287
282
 Weisbach, Efficiency Analysis, supra note 23, at 80.
283 Id.
284 Id.
285
 Gergen & Schmitz, supra note 24, at 189-91.
286 Id.  Weisbach later argued that the approach used by Gergen & Schmitz should be 
refined. Weisbach, Efficiency Analysis, supra note 23, at 81.  Specifically, Weisbach 
argued that: (1) Gergen & Schmitz looked to the elasticities of the underlying economic 
arrangements, but should have considered the elasticities of the MIPS themselves; (2) 
Gergen & Schmitz used uncompensated elasticities in their model, but should have used 
uncompensated elasticities; and (3) Gergen & Schmitz considered bankruptcy costs but 
should also have considered related issues such as the effect of debt on the monitoring of 
corporate managers.  Id. at 81.
287 See, e.g., Lawrence A. Weiss, Bankruptcy Resolution: Direct Costs and Violation of 
Priority of Claims, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 285, 285-86 (1990) (estimating direct costs of 
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Other studies include indirect costs, which include various opportunity costs, such 
as lost sales, lost profits, or the increased cost of obtaining credit.288
Some economists have argued that the costs of financial distress are 
generally insignificant when compared to the tax savings achieved from the 
interest deduction,289 but other economists have concluded that the costs of 
financial distress are quite significant.290  Andrade and Kaplan conclude that, even 
if the costs of financial distress are 10 to 25 percent of firm value, the ex ante 
expected costs of financial distress are small for most public companies because 
the probability of financial distress is small for such companies.291  The expected 
costs of distress are therefore generally trivial when compared with the tax and 
incentive benefits of debt.292
On the other hand, the expected costs of financial distress are higher for 
distressed companies that are restructuring.  The managers of a company that is 
restructuring due to financial distress must make new capital structure decisions.  
For such a distressed company, the expected costs of financial distress are much 
higher because the probability of future, post-reorganization distress is much 
higher than it is for companies generally.  Companies that emerge from a 
bankruptcy restructuring with high leverage ratios run an increased risk of a 
bankruptcy based on a study of 37 firms).
288 See, e.g., Edward I. Altman, A Further Empirical Investigation of the Bankruptcy Cost 
Question, 39 J. FIN. 1067, 1087 (1984) (indirect bankruptcy costs are significant and 
must be considered, despite the fact that indirect costs are difficult to measure).
289 See Robert A. Haugen & Lemma W. Senbet, The Insignificance of Bankruptcy Costs 
to the Theory of Optimal Capital Structure, 33 J. FIN. 383, 384 (1978) (arguing that the 
costs of financial distress are insignificant when compared to the value of the tax shield). 
See also Lawrence A. Weiss, Bankruptcy Resolution, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 285, 286 (1990) 
(direct bankruptcy costs average 3.1% of the firm's book value of debt plus the market 
value of equity and have no significant effect on capital structure decisions).
290 See, e.g., Altman, supra note 288, at 1087 (combined direct and indirect bankruptcy 
costs of firms in the study averaged between 11% and 17% of firm value prior to 
bankruptcy, with the costs exceeding 20% of the value of the firm in many cases). 
291
 Gregor Andrade & Steven N. Kaplan, How Costly is Financial (Not Economic) 
Distress?  Evidence from Highly Leveraged Transactions that Became Distressed, 53 J. 
FIN. 1443,  1488-89 (1998).
292 Id.  Debt in a firm’s capital structure can provide benefits in addition to the interest 
deduction.  For example, debt may help to monitor and discipline managers and may 
provide valuable information to investors.  See Milton Harris & Artur Raviv, Capital 
Structure and the Informational Role of Debt, 45 J. FIN. 321 (1990).  These benefits of 
debt also should be considered, in addition to the costs of financial distress.
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repeat failure.293  In addition, complex financial structures increase both the risk 
and costs of financial distress.294
We could adopt specific COD income rules for distressed corporations 
that take into account the higher costs of financial distress for such firms.  For 
example, we could adopt rules that encourage the issuance of new stock and 
discourage the issuance of new debt in bankruptcy restructurings.295  Said another 
way, we could create COD income rules that treat stock-for-debt exchanges more 
favorably than debt-for-debt exchanges.296
Mark Roe and Lucian Bebchuk, among others, have argued that 
bankruptcy law should encourage or require distressed debtor corporations to 
adopt capital structures with little or no debt.297  It is costly and difficult for firms 
to reduce their debt in a restructuring, for a variety of reasons:298
To get their debt levels down, financially distressed 
firms must either persuade creditors to write down their 
claims, or retire the debt by selling assets and/or new 
securities.  However, for a number of reasons these options 
may be quite costly: firms cannot unilaterally force a 
293
 Stuart C. Gilson, Transactions Costs and Capital Structure Choice: Evidence from 
Financially Distressed Firms, 52 J. OF FIN. 161, 166-67 (1997).   Compare Lynn M. 
LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Why are Delaware and New York Bankruptcy 
Reorganizations Failing?, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1933, 1969 (2002) (firms that re-filed for 
bankruptcy protection, after a bankruptcy reorganization, had higher leverage than 
reorganized firms that did not fail, but the difference was not statistically significant).
294
 LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 293, at 1953.  See also David A. Skeel, Jr., What’s So 
Bad About Delaware?, 54 VAND. L. REV. 309, 319 (2001) (complexity of capital 
structure may account for higher failure rates in Delaware).  The tax law debt-equity 
distinction and the “designer” hybrid securities it has spawned (such as MIPS), have 
increased complexity in corporate capital structures.
295
 In addition, we might want to encourage voluntary out-of-court workouts, so that 
corporate debtors can reduce the transaction costs of their restructuring.
296
 In the early 1990s, after the repeal of I.R.C. § 1275(a)(4) but before the repeal of the 
stock-for-debt exception to COD income, we had a set of COD income rules that favored 
stock-for-debt exchanges over debt-for-debt exchanges. 
297
 Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt: A New Model for Corporate Reorganization, 83 
COLUM. L. REV. 527, 559 (1983) (advocating an all equity structure for corporate debtors 
emerging from chapter 11); Lucian A. Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate 
Reorganizations, 101 HARV. L. REV. 775 (1988).
298
 Gilson, supra note 293, at 162.
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financial settlement on all creditors, giving individual 
creditors an incentive to hold out; various regulations 
discourage institutional lenders from writing down their 
principal or exchanging debt for equity; income from debt 
forgiveness is taxed; managers have much better 
information than outsiders about the firm’s business 
prospects; and financially distressed firms may be forced to 
sell assets at fire sale prices (or be unable to find buyers at 
any price, e.g., because their whole industry is 
depressed).299
Under the current tax approach to COD income, attribute reduction, and 
OID, corporations have an incentive to issue debt in a bankruptcy restructuring.300
In addition, the debt may be in the form of a hybrid debt instrument that results in 
a more complex capital structure.301 The § 108 rules that permit corporations to 
exclude COD income also create an incentive for a debtor corporation to 
reorganize in a bankruptcy proceeding instead of out of court.302  (The fact that a 
modification of outstanding debt is treated like a debt-for-debt exchange adds to 
299 Id.
300
 Firms can reduce the COD income generated in the restructuring by leaving the high 
level of pre-restructuring leverage in place.  Gilson notes that firms “have an incentive to 
keep their debt high to avoid creating COD income.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that 
many reorganizations are structured to minimize the amount of taxable COD income that 
is generated.”  Gilson, supra note 293, at 171.  Where the restructuring creates COD 
income that reduces the debtor corporation’s NOLs, there is a tax incentive to issue debt 
in the restructuring, in order to create deductions that can shield post-restructuring 
income from tax.
301
 For example, various particular types of hybrid instruments, such as MIPS, are 
designed to be characterized as debt for tax purposes, but to be treated as equity for other 
purposes, including certain regulatory purposes. 
302
 Debtors have an incentive to file a bankruptcy petition in order to qualify for the 
blanket exclusion of COD income in § 108(a)(1)(A), instead of relying the § 108(a)(1)(B)
insolvency exception, which requires a valuation and creates uncertainty.  I.R.C. § 
108(a)(1)(A) and (B).  The conventional wisdom is that we should encourage out-of-
court workouts instead of Chapter 11 bankruptcy restructurings.  See, e.g., Miller, supra
note 1, at 22.  Bankruptcy commentators agree that distressed firms wait too long before 
filing a bankruptcy petition.  Barry E. Adler, The Law of Last Resort, 55 VAND. L. REV. 
1661, 1694-95 (2002).  By the time the debtor corporation files the petition, it has already 
lost much of its value.  Id.  On the other hand, Stuart Gilson has argued that transaction 
costs are lower in bankruptcy restructurings than in out-of-court workouts.  Gilson, supra
note 293, at 163 (listing five reasons why transaction costs are lower in Chapter 11).  In 
addition, companies that restructure out of court reduce their leverage ratios less than 
companies that restructure in a bankruptcy proceeding.  Id. at 162.  
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the incentive to file a bankruptcy petition.)  Also, § 382 generally limits a 
corporation’s utilization of its net operating losses after an ownership change (a 
50% shift in equity ownership),303 but special rules apply where the corporation is 
reorganized in a bankruptcy proceeding.304  The § 382 rules discourage debtor 
corporations from issuing stock that would trigger  an ownership change.
Merton Miller, a Nobel Laureate economist, argues that tax commentators 
have gotten the corporate COD income rules wrong.305 In Miller’s view, the 
current tax incentives do not make sense from an economic perspective because 
they create obstacles to voluntary restructurings.306 Miller concludes that “if the 
parties can reach a voluntary agreement (achieving thereby what economists dub 
a ‘pareto-improving solution’), surely wise social policy should smile, not frown, 
on their efforts.”307
How could we alter the current COD income rules to promote economic 
efficiency?308  We could encourage distressed corporations to emerge from 
bankruptcy with more stock and less debt in their capital structures by favoring 
stock-for-debt exchanges over debt-for-debt exchanges.  For example, we could 
reinstate the set of COD rules that were in effect after the 1990 repeal of § 
1275(a)(4) but before the repeal of the stock-for-debt exception.  Perhaps we 
should also encourage voluntary out-of-court workouts by providing that debt 
modifications will not generally be treated as a debt-for-debt exchange.  If we 
were prepared to be more radical, we could equate the corporate treatment of 
303
 I.R.C. § 382(a), (d), and (g)(1) (2000).
304
 I.R.C. § 382(l)(5) and (6) (2000).
305
 Miller, supra note 1, at 22.
306 Id. at 20.
307 Id. (emphasis omitted).
308
 As Professor Weisbach has observed, the calculation of efficiency losses is more 
precisely the work of economists than of legal academics.  Weisbach, Interest Accrual, 
supra note 250, at 48.  On the other hand, the tax law should probably: (1) distinguish, 
for purposes of the creation of COD income, between debt discharge by solvent and 
insolvent debtors; (2) encourage early resolution of financial distress by minimizing the 
tax cost of restructuring in such cases; and (3) encourage distressed corporations to 
reduce the amount of debt in their capital structure during the restructuring.  Using the 
hypothetical cash issuance model to determine COD income in stock-for-debt and debt-
for-debt exchanges, and failing to distinguish between solvent and insolvent debtors, 
likely does more harm than good.
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interest and dividends and repeal § 61(a)(12) for a corporation’s dealings in its 
own debt securities, as Merton Miller has suggested.309
More generally, this Article illustrates the danger of tax commentators 
creating tax rules in isolation, based on theoretical norms such as the 
comprehensive tax base norm or horizontal equity norm, without sufficient 
concern for the economic effects of those tax rules.  The repeal of the debt-for-
debt exception and stock-for-debt exception made sense to tax commentators and 
the Treasury Department because the repeal was consistent with the horizontal 
equity norm.  On the other hand, the repeal baffled economists310 and the 
bankruptcy and bankruptcy tax bar311 and occurred without their participation.312
309
 Miller, supra note 1, at 22.
310 Id.
311
 Lee A. Sheppard, Cold Comfort: Determining Tax Liability In Bankruptcy, 91 TAX 
NOTES TODAY 162-6 (August 2, 1991):
[O]ne telling exchange concerned the recent repeal of section 
1275(a)(4), a subject that frustrates and baffles bankruptcy 
lawyers. Andrew Dubroff, an attorney-advisor in Treasury's 
Office of Tax Legislative Counsel, sought to justify repeal on the 
grounds of proper income measurement and the notion that the 
section 108 exclusions from cancellation of indebtedness income 
constitute a subsidy. "Subsidy? How do you think a creditor 
feels?" Alan Miller of Weil, Gotshal & Manges reacted. "The tax 
hit comes to the creditor on top of having to write down the debt. 
It is the creditors who are subsidizing the government," said 
Miller, who handled the Drexel Burnham Lambert bankruptcy. 
Dubroff replied that the government is an involuntary creditor; 
moreover, the creditor is allowed to recognize a tax loss for 
writing down the debt.
312
 Paul Asofsky and others have drawn attention to the defects in the process used to 
enact the repeal.  See, e.g., Asofsky, supra note 76.  The repeal was, at least in part, the 
result of last-minute political horse trading that was designed to fund special interest 
legislation.  Id. at 13-32.  For example, the provision repealing the stock-for-debt 
exception was added to fund an investment tax credit for intermodal cargo containers.  
Asofsky calls this provision “a rancid piece of political pork.”  Id.  Asofsky compares the 
recent process to the process used to enact the Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980.  In the late 
1970s, tax and bankruptcy experts worked together to fashion those changes in the tax 
law.  The process used to enact the Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980 stands as an example of 
good tax legislation, because of the full participation of all interested parties.  Id.  at 13-
14.  “The Bankruptcy Tax Act was not a perfect statute, but it is a model piece of 
legislation. It was the product of extended study and debate, and it represented a rational 
compromise of competing views and interests.” Id.  Asofsky has argued that the process 
that has been used to change the tax treatment of COD income since 1980 has been 
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V. CONCLUSION.
Early case law adopted a substitution of liabilities approach to COD 
income in debt-for-debt and stock-for-debt exchanges.313  Over time we replaced 
the substitution of liabilities approach with a hypothetical cash issuance 
approach.314  The conventional wisdom among tax commentators is that this 
change in the COD income rules was justified by a comprehensive tax base norm 
or horizontal equity norm.315
Other approaches are, however, also defensible under the comprehensive 
tax base or horizontal equity norm.  This Article highlights the connection 
between COD income rules and OID rules and considers the implications of the 
error correction function of the COD income rules.  The earlier substitution of 
liabilities approach to COD, or a variation known as subscription price theory, can 
be reconciled with the theory underlying existing COD income doctrine, although 
it may require a different sort of error correction device than we currently employ. 
If we equated the interest and dividend treatment of corporate issuers, 
corporations arguably should not have income from debt discharge, just as they 
currently have no income from dealings in the corporation’s own stock.  Even if 
we retain the corporate interest deduction in its current form, we could fashion a 
different error correction device that requires interest deduction recapture in 
stock-for-debt exchanges.  In debt-for-debt exchanges, we could reinstate the 
carryover issue price rule that precludes COD income where the face of the new 
debt at least equals the face of the old debt.  The notion of a comprehensive tax 
base does not preclude a transactional approach to COD income in debt-for-debt 
and stock-for-debt exchanges.
In addition, it may be preferable, from a normative perspective, to apply 
principles of economic efficiency to determine the tax rules for calculating COD 
income in debt-for-debt and stock-for-debt transactions.316 Professor Weisbach 
has argued that we should determine the tax consequences of various types of 
seriously flawed.  He takes the position that, since that time, Congress has, with little 
debate, consideration, or public comment, gradually eviscerated the provisions of the 
Bankruptcy Tax Act.  Id. at § 13.01.
313 See infra Part III.
314 Id.
315 See, e.g., Kies, supra note 157.
316 See infra Part IV.B. 1. and 2.
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transactions by attempting to minimize deadweight losses.317 The issue is 
complicated because of the second-best setting in which the issue arises.  The 
hypothetical cash issuance model is designed to produce consistency in the 
treatment of debt discharge, but this model may increase economic distortions 
caused by the debt-equity distinction.  For example, using the hypothetical cash 
issuance model to determine COD income in debt-for-debt and stock-for-debt 
exchanges may increase the costs of financial distress, especially where the 
corporate issuer is financially troubled318 Congress adopted the hypothetical cash 
issuance model without sufficiently considering the economic effects of the new 
tax rules on workouts and bankruptcy restructurings.  
317
 Weisbach, Line Drawing, supra note 23; Weisbach, Efficiency Analysis, supra note 
23.
318 See infra Part IV.B.2.
